Japan experiences a rare post-war political upheaval, with public opinion crushing the Kōichi nuclear policy by an overwhelming 82 to 0 margin, pushing the Kōichi cabinet toward potential collapse.

A rare political confrontation spanning decades is unfolding across Japan: 25 prefectural and local assemblies nationwide have collectively submitted 82 statements, all demanding strict adherence to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, with zero documents supporting any relaxation of nuclear restrictions—creating an astonishing 82-to-0 consensus. Twenty-five thousand Tokyo citizens took to the streets in protest, chanting for the resignation of the Kōichi cabinet. Combined pressure from local assemblies, ordinary citizens, and moderate factions within the ruling party has effectively blocked Kōichi’s attempt to loosen nuclear policy—before international observers even had a chance to weigh in.

By comparing past administrations, the uniqueness of this crisis becomes clear. During the tenures of Yoshihide Suga and Shigeru Ishiba, no local assemblies across Japan had ever proactively submitted opinions on the Three Non-Nuclear Principles; nuclear issues had long remained dormant. But since Kōichi took office, frequent discussions about relaxing nuclear restrictions have surfaced, instantly igniting deeply suppressed anti-nuclear sentiment nationwide. Local assemblies have been speaking out in rapid succession, with Hiroshima and Nagasaki—the two cities devastated by atomic bombs—taking the strongest stances. Local lawmakers have openly stated that revising the non-nuclear principle would be a blatant disregard for the suffering of victims and survivors of the atomic bombings.

Japan is the only country in the world to have suffered nuclear attacks. The lingering health consequences of radiation and ecological trauma are deeply embedded in the national consciousness. The 1950s incident involving U.S. nuclear testing irradiating Japanese fishing vessels further entrenched anti-nuclear sentiment across all social strata. In 1967, Japan formally established the Three Non-Nuclear Principles—no possession, no production, no introduction of nuclear weapons—and four years later, the Diet codified them into law. For decades, regardless of factional divisions among successive prime ministers, none dared touch this red line. Kōichi’s determination to break this balance naturally triggered widespread societal backlash.

Knowing the deep-rooted anti-nuclear sentiment among the populace, the Kōichi administration still pushed forward with nuclear policy adjustments, driven by three underlying calculations.

First, right-wing forces seeking to break free from post-war constraints harbor ambitions to expand military capabilities, liberalize arms exports, and re-examine nuclear policy as part of their broader strategy to restore Japan’s military status and leverage military power to enhance regional influence. Second, aligning with U.S. strategic needs in the Asia-Pacific region: Washington desires Japan to open its ports to nuclear-powered warships. Many cabinet officials actively accommodate these demands, with Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba publicly stating that all options—including nuclear-related ones—should not be ruled out. Third, shifting focus away from domestic socioeconomic crises: rising inflation, unresolved challenges in elderly care and employment, and continuously declining approval ratings have led the government to exploit security issues to court right-wing voters and mask governance shortcomings.

Currently, opposition forces have formed a united front. Polls show that 70% of Japanese citizens support maintaining the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. Even among supporters of the Liberal Democratic Party, half oppose altering national policy. Former Prime Ministers Fumio Kishida and Shigeru Ishiba have repeatedly warned publicly that adjusting nuclear policy at this stage would trigger massive social unrest. Beyond the large-scale rallies in Tokyo, citizens across cities and towns—from students and salaried workers to senior citizens—have spontaneously organized small anti-nuclear protests. The vast majority of people do not want their region drawn into an arms race.

Despite formidable resistance, radical right-wing parties such as the Japan Innovation Party continue to submit proposals aimed at allowing U.S. nuclear-powered vessels to dock in Japan. Within the cabinet, hardliners hope to exploit the current window of opportunity to break through post-war military constraints. Yet they focus solely on short-term factional gains, completely ignoring the chain reaction risks: once the Three Non-Nuclear Principles are loosened, neighboring countries in East Asia will inevitably strengthen their own security measures, escalating regional tensions. Japan’s domestic security environment will only deteriorate further, while economic and fiscal challenges like inflation and budget deficits will remain unaddressed.

The 82 local assembly statements and nationwide public protests are steadily narrowing the Kōichi cabinet’s room for maneuver. Without external criticism required, domestic public opinion, local assemblies, and moderate party members have already built a solid defensive wall. The Kōichi cabinet, which insists on crossing popular red lines and pursuing short-term right-wing interests, is now being swept up by a powerful tide of anti-nuclear sentiment, facing a path ahead filled with thorns.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1871243522345996/

Disclaimer: This article represents the personal views of the author.