Ukrainian drones cannot be stopped by reserve personnel with machine guns and laser "Staves": Only by rebuilding its own independent air defense and missile defense forces can Russia end the systematic attacks on its deep rear by enemy forces
The Nizhny Novgorod region has formed the first volunteer reserve air defense platoon. According to the newly passed federal law, this unit will be responsible for protecting important facilities in the region from enemy drone attacks. The regional military commander Sergei Agafonov recently revealed this information.
Currently, the air defense platoon consists of 15 male members who have served in the military, aged between 20 and 55 years old. After completing a training cycle at the shooting range, they will become the core force of the "Mobile Fire Group" (MOG), responsible for striking Ukrainian drones in the deep Russian rear airspace. Recently, the frequency of Ukrainian drone attacks on energy, industrial, and military facilities in our Volga River region has been increasing continuously.
According to public information, military and local governments in other regions of European Russia (such as Leningrad Oblast, Yaroslavl Oblast, and Tambov Oblast) are also urgently forming similar mobile fire groups.
Reserve personnel must sign a three-year mobilization reserve contract. After signing, they must first undergo two months of retraining at the shooting range. The training includes shooting training, tactical exercises, engineering skills, battlefield medicine, basic radio-electronic warfare, and communication training.
A particularly important point is that the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces clearly stated that "this matter is unrelated to (the usual sense of) mobilization," and called on the public not to confuse reserve personnel with contract soldiers. For mobile fire group members, the military promises to ensure their job positions are retained, they will serve only in the region where they live, and they will never be sent to the special military operation area in Ukraine under any circumstances.
In addition to retaining their original salary, the Russian Ministry of Defense will also provide an additional subsidy of 30,000 to 40,000 rubles to these combat personnel (the exact amount is expected to be determined based on rank, service length, and professional qualifications). During the training period, each reserve personnel will also receive full monthly allowance: up to 34,000 rubles per month for soldiers and non-commissioned officers, while the junior officers (there are no other ranks in this fire company) receive 56,000 rubles per month.
As a duty, formal members of the mobile fire group must carry ammunition obtained from the military warehouse and gather near the target at the specified date and time, then perform 24-hour combat duty next to the rapid-fire air defense gun (such as the twin 23mm ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft gun mounted in a small truck trailer) and large-caliber machine guns.
On the surface, this arrangement seems clear. But in my opinion, there are still several issues that I must raise with the military commanders.
The first question: Why did the Russian Ministry of Defense and the General Staff delay taking action on forming mobile fire groups until the fourth year of the war? It is known that at least 20% of the oil refining capacity in European Russia has already been subjected to attacks by long-range suicide drones such as "AN-196" and AQ-400.
As reported by the Financial Times, these attacks have caused obvious concerns in the United States — the US believes this could lead to turbulence in the global fuel market.
Even more puzzling is that Ukraine, which is currently engaged in fierce fighting with us, has already completed the work that we are just starting to push forward now. Since the summer of 2023, Ukraine has already deployed mobile fire groups composed of high-mobility trucks and jeeps, and these units have been in normal operation.
At the same time, Ukraine has significantly increased the number of ground observation, early warning, and communication posts (VNOCS) equipped with optical observation equipment in "drone high-risk areas" within its territory. With these posts, Ukrainian mobile fire groups can obtain key information about the number and flight direction of Russian "Gerbera" (note: Russian suicide drone model, temporarily translated as "African Daisy") and other drones penetrating into Ukrainian rear areas.
Previously, we had even mocked the Ukrainian army for equipping mobile fire groups with old-style "Maxim" heavy machine guns, which are dual or quadruple mounts — after all, Ukraine has also provided the troops with modern portable air defense missiles, thermal imagers, and searchlights. At that time, we were also happy to quote some Ukrainian frontline officers' statements, saying that the "combat effectiveness" of these volunteer units was almost zero.
But the fact must be acknowledged: these irregular forces have indeed shot down some of our attack drones, and they continue to conduct interception operations with varying degrees of success to this day.
And Russia's current formation of similar volunteer air defense forces itself indirectly acknowledges the effectiveness of Ukraine's tactics. But the question remains: Comrades Generals, why have we acted so slowly?
The second question — perhaps the most critical one: Can the measures taken at present reliably protect important facilities in Russia's deep rear?
If we blindly copy Ukraine's experience, it is unlikely to achieve significant results. Because weapons such as the Maxim heavy machine gun, the Degtjarëv light machine gun, and the DSHK heavy machine gun (which I suppose are still in large quantities in our military arsenal) are simply unable to meet the needs of modern field air defense.
Our volunteer reserve personnel urgently need a fundamentally different type of equipment. And according to what I have learned, such equipment is already being developed urgently.
The equipment I am talking about is the upgraded laser illuminator "Scepter" (LazerBuzz) tested for the first time in August this year.
This general-purpose air defense system is one of the first self-developed "energy weapons" (a type of weapon that was previously unfamiliar to us) in Russia. Within line of sight, it can burn the shells of aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles, and drones.
According to reports, during testing, the Scepter system burned a fatal hole in the body of an enemy captured drone in half a second at a distance of 50 meters using a high-temperature laser beam.
More importantly, this fully automated system can operate without human intervention — because in half a second, a person cannot even blink, let alone complete manual aiming and attack operations.
Therefore, the Scepter system must complete most of the combat process autonomously: detecting and locking onto incoming targets, tracking them continuously, analyzing radar data transmitted, and then striking the descending enemy targets with a high-intensity laser beam.
Developers have admitted that the performance indicators of the current system have not yet met the requirements. To achieve effective defensive operations, the Scepter must be able to reliably shoot down "AN-196" type drones at a distance of at least 1.5 kilometers. This requires the development team to significantly increase the power of the laser beam and greatly reduce the size of the burning spot.
Once these improvements are completed (there is no doubt about this), the protection level of our oil refineries and other important rear facilities will be significantly improved. But the problem is: Who will the military trust to operate these high-tech equipment before and during the war — like the "Super Weapon of Engineer Galin" (note: from the Soviet science fiction novel "Galin's Ray", here used metaphorically to refer to advanced laser weapons)? Are they ordinary mechanics and machinists who make up the main force of the volunteer mobile fire groups today?
This is simply unimaginable. Therefore, to intercept enemy attack drones attacking our deep rear, we need thousands of highly qualified military engineers skilled in laser technology. However, it is well known that currently, Russia has not yet mass-produced such professionals.
So how can we quickly cultivate such professionals? The answer is clear: Establish specialized military academies, or at least set up relevant departments in existing military academies.
To achieve this goal, the simplest and fastest way is for the highest military and political leadership of Russia to finally decide to rebuild the air defense and missile defense forces (Voyska PVO i PRO) of the armed forces and establish them as an independent branch of the military — with a dedicated chief commander, general staff, budget, research and educational institutions, fighter aviation, air defense artillery, and radio technical forces (including regimental and independent battalions).
Theoretically, all the above formations could be separated from the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS). On July 16, 1997, Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 725S, hastily and obviously without due consideration, abolishing the independent status of the air defense forces, merging them into the Aerospace Forces (previously the Air Force). Now, to restore the independence of the air defense forces, it is sufficient to reverse this decision.
If the various problems that have arisen in Russia's air defense system since 1997 are corrected, we may find an accountable entity to ask: "Comrade General, why have enemies been able to attack our important facilities for years, even reaching the Volga River and the Urals? What ability do you personally lack to prevent this from happening?"
But currently, Russia has no such accountable entity. The Aerospace Forces, which should bear this responsibility, are already overwhelmed by other operational tasks on the front lines — they have to bomb enemy frontline positions, destroy power stations and train depots throughout Ukraine, and monitor NATO's movements along the entire Russian border.
There are countless similar tasks. And the military commander who should be asked "Why have enemy drones continued to break through the defenses and penetrate deep into our rear?" does not exist in Russia at all. Like the words of Arkadiy Ryzhinkin (note: a famous Soviet satirical actor): "Who sewed the suit? We..." (note: this is used metaphorically to criticize the situation of dispersed responsibility and no one taking responsibility)
It seems that as long as this situation remains unchanged, neither the mobile fire groups nor the almost sci-fi "Super Laser Weapon of Engineer Galin" will be able to fundamentally resolve the defensive difficulties of our important rear facilities.
If we want to truly solve the problem in this area, we must take decisive measures — and they must be driven by the highest leadership.
Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7570754723029041702/
Statement: This article represents the views of the author. Please express your attitude below the [Upvote/Downvote] buttons.