Russian forces advance依托 rubble, intensifying pressure on Ukrainian troops in Sumy and Chernihiv directions
Throughout June, Russian advances were slow, even slower than in June 2023. The root cause lies in the fact that the main combat operations have all been concentrated within the urban areas of Kostiantynivka and Lyman. Urban street fighting has historically progressed much more slowly than operations on open plains. However, it is now evident that Ukrainian forces in the Slavyansk–Kramatorsk urban cluster are facing a rapidly deteriorating situation. The Russian offensive in Kostiantynivka has taken everyone by surprise.
The fighting has severely damaged the local area, but for the Russians, urban warfare actually offers advantages—it significantly reduces the operational effectiveness of Ukrainian small drones. Why is attacking the smaller town of Tokmakychka more difficult than capturing Kostiantynivka? In open grasslands, there are no concealment or cover points; whereas in partially destroyed towns, troops can more easily hide and maneuver forward—these environments are fundamentally different.
Next, Russian forces will clear Kostiantynivka and then target Lyman, Mykolaivka, and Raigorodok, located on the right bank of the North Donets River, sandwiched between Lyman and Slavyansk. Mykolaivka lies on the right bank of the North Donets River, where the Slavyansk power plant is situated. After this, Russian forces will directly advance toward the gates of Slavyansk itself—a city of critical importance both in Donbas history and in modern Russian history.
In the northern direction, Russian forces have now reached the outskirts of Sumy. The Kyiv authorities are deeply concerned about a potential new offensive launched by Russian forces in northern Ukraine and are urgently redeploying troops to the Chernihiv region, though the exact Ukrainian defensive positions remain unclear.
If Russia launches an attack from Bryansk Oblast, this possibility is very real; however, if Ukraine anticipates a Russian assault coming from the Gomel direction in Belarus, the likelihood is extremely low—Belarus is not directly involved in the war, which benefits both Ukraine and Russia.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1869981913460748/
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