3771 words in this article
Estimated reading time: 9 minutes
Author | Lisa Curtis
Translated by | Rao Jinshan
Translation Reviewers | Wang Jiaoyang, Jiang Bo
Editor of This Issue | He Jiawei
Reviewer of This Issue | Jiang Yi
Editor's Note
India and Pakistan have clashed over Kashmir and then ceased fire. President Trump has loudly claimed credit for it. Lisa Curtis, who served as the senior director for South and Central Asia at the National Security Council during Trump's first term, is concerned about this. In her view, military conflicts between India and Pakistan pose a risk of full-scale war, and the United States should not stand by idly; however, completely resolving the Kashmir issue is beyond the U.S.'s capacity, and meddling recklessly will only exacerbate the situation. Trump had already loudly intervened in the Kashmir issue during his first term, but the result was counterproductive. In his second term, he should learn from this lesson. Curtis "advises" the Trump administration to act cautiously, leveraging its advantage as a common partner of India and Pakistan, striving to play the role of a "crisis manager," aiming to prevent the situation from spiraling out of control rather than fantasizing about a permanent resolution. As a "letter of advice" published by a senior South Asian researcher in an authoritative American political magazine, this article reflects to some extent the views of Washington's strategic community on the India-Pakistan dispute and their concerns about Trump's diplomatic style. Notably, due to India's strategic value in containing China's rise, Curtis places great emphasis on U.S.-India relations. In the article, she deliberately ignores the role of Modi's government in promoting Hindu nationalism, persecuting minority groups, and adopting chauvinistic foreign policies that have escalated the Kashmir situation, instead attributing the blame to Pakistan, emphasizing its need to exercise restraint, and even advocating that the U.S. should pressure Pakistan. The South Asian Research Newsletter has specially translated this article for your critical reference.
Image source: Internet
On May 10, 2025, President Trump tweeted that India and Pakistan had agreed to a ceasefire, which brought relief to the world. These two nuclear-armed neighbors had previously exchanged missiles and conducted drone attacks on military facilities and religious sites for three days, bringing them to the brink of a full-scale war. After the Indian military attacked the Nur Khan Air Force Base near the Pakistani nuclear command forces, the danger increased sharply, possibly leading to an uncontrollable situation, forcing the U.S. to intervene, despite high-level officials stating the government had no intention of getting involved.
However, although the gunfire had temporarily ceased, the crisis was far from resolved. Within hours after the ceasefire agreement took effect, both sides were still fighting. Expecting India and Pakistan, these long-standing rivals, to quickly resolve the fundamental conflict over Kashmir is nothing short of a fantasy. The disputed mountainous territory has been a source of contention since the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947. Since then, Kashmir has held symbolic significance for both countries, profoundly shaping their national identities. Pakistan considers itself the "homeland" of South Asian Muslims, believing its claim to Kashmir is justified because the region is predominantly Muslim. Indian officials reject this claim, viewing the area as an integral part of their territory, especially considering that the original ruler of the Jammu and Kashmir princely state (a Hindu) chose to join India before the partition.
India and Pakistan have fought two wars and experienced one border conflict over the status of Kashmir, with multiple military crises. Since 2014, the Modi government, which adheres to Hindu nationalism, has responded increasingly strongly to terrorist attacks along the Line of Control (the de facto border). General Asim Munir, Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan, known for his hardline stance, criticized India's actions in Kashmir and the tensions between Hindus and Muslims in mid-April. Both sides demand that their governments never back down.
Trump, who boasts of being a master negotiator, may want to solve the Kashmir issue once and for all, but he is destined to fail. Efforts by Washington to achieve a final agreement would only stimulate Pakistan to support more terrorism, harm U.S.-India relations, and ultimately be futile. The U.S. should urge Pakistan to reduce support for terrorism and call on both sides to respect the Line of Control, but its role can only be that of a "crisis manager," which is its proper responsibility. The Kashmir dispute is an intractable problem that cannot be solved and must not be ignored. The U.S. should not attempt to resolve it completely, but should continuously strive to avoid the situation spiraling out of control.
One, The Line of Division
The cause of this conflict is typical, following the same pattern that has triggered military crises between the two countries over the past 25 years. On April 22, a terrorist attack occurred in Indian-controlled Kashmir, killing 26 civilians, mostly Indian tourists. India unilaterally accused the attackers of being directed by the Lashkar-e-Taiba, a terrorist organization based in Pakistan (designated as such by the U.S.), and on May 7, it bombed the organization's headquarters in Muridke, as well as eight targets in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir and Punjab province. India claimed the targets were all "terrorist infrastructure," but it is unclear whether all these locations meet this description. One of the victims was Abdul Rauf Azhar, the mastermind behind the 1999 Indian Airlines Flight 814 hijacking, a designated terrorist by the U.S. (In that case, India was forced to release the terrorist leader, including Omar Sheikh, who kidnapped Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl in 2002, and Pearl was later brutally murdered). India's retaliatory action led to the most severe confrontation since the Kargil conflict in 1999, when Pakistani regular forces disguised as militants occupied territory on the Indian side of the Line of Control for a brief campaign, resulting in two months of fighting and thousands of soldiers killed on both sides. However, the Kargil conflict was limited to specific areas of Kashmir, whereas this battle occurred along the Line of Control, crossing the borders into territories outside of Kashmir on both sides. Both sides used drones and missiles to strike military and religious targets across the border, adding uncertainty and the risk of the situation spiraling out of control.
Initially, despite Secretary of State Rubio calling both India and Pakistan, President Trump and Vice President Vance showed little interest in getting involved. Trump said on April 25, "They always find solutions." Vance stated on May 8, "It's none of our business." However, after India attacked the Nur Khan base on May 9, the U.S. became extremely worried that the two sides might plunge into a nuclear war. Minister Khawaja Asif had previously warned, "If our survival faces a direct threat," they would consider using nuclear weapons. The U.S. feared that India's attack on the Nur Khan base marked New Delhi's possible destruction of Pakistan's nuclear command system, crossing the red line for Pakistan to use nuclear weapons. The Trump administration eventually mediated the ceasefire, which surprised everyone but also reassured them.
Hours after announcing the mediation success, Trump said he would expand trade with both countries and assist them in permanently solving the thorny Kashmir dispute. However, the divergent reactions of India and Pakistan to the ceasefire statement indicate that this effort is destined to be futile. Both countries are vying for the narrative dominance of the ceasefire: India denies the substantial role of Washington in the negotiations, while the Pakistani Prime Minister publicly thanked Trump for his intervention. India also flatly rejected the notion of its commitment to bilateral dialogue on a wide range of issues, despite Rubio explicitly mentioning this in the ceasefire statement, which the Pakistani side also confirmed.
India downplaying the role of the U.S. in facilitating the ceasefire is not surprising. India has consistently opposed third-party mediation of its disputes with Pakistan, and is particularly sensitive to any hint of international involvement in the Kashmir issue. Islamabad, on the other hand, hopes to bring attention to the issue and convince Washington that resolving the dispute is crucial to avoiding a nuclear war between India and Pakistan. India is the status quo maintainer, while Pakistan has repeatedly provoked crises through supporting terrorist attacks or directly seizing territory (such as the Kargil conflict). After the 1999 conflict, former President Clinton clearly stated that both countries should respect the Line of Control, and neither side could change the territorial status through bloodshed, which India fully supported.
Two, Crisis Management
Considering the complex history of the Kashmir dispute and India's sensitivity to external intervention, if the Trump administration wants to continue deepening its strategic partnership with India and curb Pakistan's support for terrorism, it must proceed with caution. Stepping back from the edge of war is vastly different from promoting a permanent solution to an 80-year-old dispute. The former is something Washington has historically excelled at, while the latter can only be achieved by India and Pakistan themselves.
Trump should learn from the previous mistakes, as he had failed in mediating the Kashmir issue. In July 2019, he claimed in a joint press conference with then-Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan that Indian Prime Minister Modi had invited him to mediate the Kashmir dispute. This was extremely absurd, and anyone familiar with South Asian politics could recognize its falsehood. As a presidential assistant and senior director for South and Central Asia at the National Security Council at the time, the author experienced one of the most embarrassing moments of his career at the NSC. Just two weeks after Trump made this statement, India revoked the special autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir and split it into two union territories. Obviously, New Delhi was asserting that there was no room for discussion regarding changing the territorial status of Kashmir. After being briefed on the situation, Trump did not mention mediation again during his first term, and it would be unwise for him to repeat this mistake now.
The reason is simple: once the ghost of international mediation appears, it will encourage Islamabad's unrealistic expectations - that a final solution will give Pakistan more Kashmiri territory. This false belief provides fertile ground for terrorist organizations like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed within Pakistan, whose leaders claim to have lost several relatives in recent Indian airstrikes. Unrealistic expectations may also stimulate Pakistan to take a full-scale offensive. In 1999, then-Pakistani President Musharraf attempted to raise the international profile of the Kashmir issue through the Kargil infiltration operation. Now, the leadership of the Pakistani military may resort to similar tactics by orchestrating new attacks to attract international attention.
To prevent Pakistan from raising the heat of the Kashmir issue, Trump must not actively propose mediating the dispute, which would be exactly what Islamabad wants. He should reiterate the absolute legitimacy of the Line of Control and focus on achievable goals, such as maintaining the current ceasefire. Both India and Pakistan cannot afford the cost of escalating military conflict, and they are just one step away from a full-scale war. The ceasefire agreement brokered by the U.S. provides both sides with an "honorable exit": both can claim victory while gradually reducing the intensity of confrontation. Trump should ensure that this situation continues. For this, the U.S. must closely monitor the implementation of the ceasefire and promptly identify violations. Rubio should continue to call and urge both sides to maintain military restraint.
Secondly, Washington should pressure Pakistan on counterterrorism. Although analysts have not yet confirmed whether Pakistan was involved in the latest attacks, the country is implicated in numerous terrorist atrocities, such as the 2008 Mumbai attacks, making Islamabad responsible for eliminating terrorist groups within its borders. For example, Pakistan could transfer Hafiz Mohammad Sayeed, the leader of Lashkar-e-Taiba, from house arrest to prison. This move would weaken the organization's strength and demonstrate the Pakistani government's determination to combat terrorism.
Most importantly, Washington must strengthen its role as a crisis manager. The U.S. can build solid relationships with both India and Pakistan. India is more important to the U.S., due to its rapidly growing economic and military technological capabilities, its role in the Quad (U.S., Japan, India, Australia), and its willingness to counter China's rise. However, maintaining good relations with Pakistan also serves U.S. interests, partly to offset China's influence in South Asia. The U.S. cannot completely distance Pakistan from China, and the U.S.-Pakistan relationship will not return to the honeymoon period after 9/11, when the U.S. provided billions of dollars in economic and military aid. However, the U.S. can now offer Pakistan assistance in areas such as trade, investment, and educational opportunities. For the Trump administration, completely ignoring Pakistan would be unwise. Only by maintaining communication channels with both India and Pakistan can the U.S. play a credible intermediary role in times of crisis.
Trump is not incapable of promoting dialogue between the two sides, but he must restrain the impulse to directly intervene in the Kashmir issue. If the U.S. insists on meddling in this sensitive and complicated issue, it will lose the trust and partnership of India, a key pillar of the Indo-Pacific strategy, and also embolden terrorist groups in Pakistan that seek to create conflict and destabilize the region. For Washington, the wise choice is to recognize the limits of its influence, focus on preventing war, and refrain from seeking lasting peace.
About the Author: Lisa Curtis is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Indo-Pacific Security Project at the Center for a New American Security. She served as a Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior Director for South and Central Asia at the National Security Council during the Trump administration.
This article is translated from an article titled "How America Can Keep the Peace Between India and Pakistan" published in Foreign Affairs on May 13, 2025. Original link:
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/india/how-america-can-keep-peace-between-india-and-pakistan.
Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7562235609130025481/
Disclaimer: The article represents the views of the author and readers are welcome to express their opinions by clicking on the [Up/Down] buttons below.