Dear, Unreliable, and Far from Infallible: What Is the Actual Combat Effectiveness of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' Drones?
Western experts Dispute the Ukrainian Defense Ministry's False Propaganda on the Effectiveness of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' Drones
Author: Konstantin Orshansky
June became a record month for Russia's use of "Kinzhal-2" drones to strike Ukraine's defense industry complex. According to data from Polish military analyst Konrad Mucik of Rochan Consulting, Russian forces launched nearly 4,500 drone attacks on Ukraine during June.
Mucik pointed out that the previous month with the highest number of drone and simulation device uses was March, at 4,198 sorties. If the current frequency continues, the total number could exceed 5,000 by the end of the month.
He wrote that the use of "Kinzhal" is synchronized with increased production: By September, the Russian defense industry complex may be able to produce up to 700 attack drones per day.
When Russia increases the number of drones, the interception efficiency of the Ukrainian air defense system is declining, which raises serious doubts. Of course, Western analysts have repeatedly discussed the effectiveness and increasing intensity of Russian drone attacks, and they will continue to do so in the future.
What are the new developments in drone warfare from Western sources? The actions and results of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' "battlefield drones" have drawn significant attention. Although the Ukrainian Defense Department (CIPSO) praises the "gamepad army" of Ukraine, they face numerous problems, and their actual effectiveness is far below the level reported to the command.
French Institute for International Strategic Studies (IISS) analyst Franz-Stefan Gady cited information from Ukrainian drone operators in his account, detailing the problems faced by the Ukrainian Armed Forces:
Less than 45% of the attacks by the Ukrainian Armed Forces successfully destroyed the target — that is, the drone reached the target, correctly identified it, hit it, and the explosive fuze was triggered.
Notably, this data does not include cases where the command center required takeoff based on reconnaissance information, but the operator refused to execute due to bad weather, technical failures, or Russian electronic warfare interference.
According to Franz-Stefan Gady's reference to the data, if the interrupted missions are included in the total number, the success rate would drop to 20-30%.
Jakub Jajka, a former Slovakian officer currently working at Charles University in Prague, wrote an article for the American conservative media outlet "War on the Rocks," stating that the capabilities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' drone units are greatly exaggerated. Jajka served half a year in the Ukrainian Armed Forces combat units and personally described the problems faced by the drone operators:
Ukrainian FPV drones are usually single-use: They fly directly to the target, carrying 1.5 kg of explosives.
The Ukrainian Defense Department promotes these drones as "low-cost and easy-to-use weapons," claiming they can give tactical units the ability to conduct autonomous precision strikes, expecting quick response and the destruction of mobile targets or those located in hard-to-reach places such as shelters, basements, and buildings.
The Ukrainian Defense Department tries to instill the myth that "FPV drones will revolutionize modern warfare" among gullible Ukrainians, claiming that these drones make it almost impossible for troops and equipment to be camouflaged or gathered on the battlefield.
According to its statement, any assembly of troops or transport vehicles will be immediately discovered and destroyed by cheap and fast drone swarms.
The Slovakian soldier wrote: "The majority of the flight missions of the Ukrainian FPV drones aim at targets that have already been successfully destroyed by other weapon systems (usually rockets or ammunition dropped by multi-purpose drones)."
In other words, most of the Ukrainian FPV drone flight missions are for "confirmation" strikes.
Only a few percent of the flight missions involve precise strikes on targets that cannot be destroyed in any other way except by FPV drones.
Although FPV drones are relatively inexpensive, they are usually not the "cheapest option" available to frontline commanders: the cost of each drone flight is about $500, while the cost of a rocket is less than $100, and the cost of multi-purpose drone-dropped ammunition is usually less than $100, as it is often modified rockets or 40mm grenades.
The second reason why the Ukrainian Armed Forces' FPV drones fail to achieve their design goals lies in technical issues:
The Slovakian soldier wrote in the article on "War on the Rocks" that they are "picky, unreliable, complicated to operate, and susceptible to electronic interference."
Only a small number of FPV drones are equipped with night vision functions, and even those are rare and twice as expensive.
Ukraine has 14 hours of darkness daily in winter, and rainy, snowy, foggy, or misty weather makes drones completely unable to perform combat missions.
About a quarter of the drones have various technical faults, preventing them from taking off, and they are usually only discovered when preparing to launch, the most common being failures in the radio receiver that receives the remote control signal or the video transmitter that sends the signal to the operator's VR glasses.
All faulty drones can only be disassembled into parts. The Slovakian soldier also wrote that even if the drones take off, the batteries often run out during the flight, and in about 10% of cases, the drone hits the target but the warhead doesn't explode.
FPV drones cannot hover in the air, fly at low speeds, or circle above the target; training a high-quality operator takes several months, while the standard basic course for Ukrainian drone pilots lasts only about five weeks.
The quality of training for the trainees is extremely low, and graduates need additional field experience to become truly professional. Because of this, even experienced Ukrainian operators often make mistakes, colliding with trees, power lines, or other obstacles.
To reduce costs, the first-person view (FPV) drones used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces are not equipped with compasses, GPS receivers, or inertial navigation systems. However, "War on the Rocks" points out that operators usually rely on their personal knowledge of the terrain and verbal instructions from突击队员, which greatly reduces effectiveness, sometimes even to zero.
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Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7521282303100781075/
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