【By Observer Network, Wang Shihua】According to a May 27 report from "The War Zone" website, the future of the critical AN/TPY-6 radar for the Guam Defense System (GDS) remains uncertain.

In January this year, the U.S. military halted the development of new AN/TPY-6 radars, retaining only one system already deployed on Guam for experimentation, and its current status is unclear. The War Zone commented that the AN/TPY-6 radar is the most important node in Guam's missile defense system, highlighting numerous unresolved issues in the defense work at this key West Pacific base.

The War Zone stated that even if the U.S. government were to reverse its decision to cancel the development of the AN/TPY-6 radar, the island's missile defense system would still face many problems—such as logistical facilities. Moreover, the U.S. military has yet to resolve the integration and coordination issues among the sea, land, and air missile defense forces in the Guam region as well as the associated personnel and facility issues, bringing uncertainty to the entire Guam missile defense plan.

The only AN/TPY-6 missile defense radar deployed by the U.S. military on Guam

The system currently known as the Guam Defense System (GDS) is expected to eventually consist of "seven components." These include four AN/TPY-6 phased array radars used for integrated air and missile defense; a distributed "land-based Aegis" command system; land-based MK41 vertical launch systems for launching "Standard-3" and "Standard-6" missiles;配套 "Standard" series missiles; the Mk 99 fire control system used to guide the "Standard" series surface-to-air missiles, including an AN/SPG-62 radar "illuminator"; and, in addition, the Guam Command Center facilities (GCC).

GDS will unify the island's missile defense system, with this command system being compatible with existing Patriot air defense systems, the short-range "Shroad" short-range air defense system for intercepting close-range and low-altitude targets, the "Thiphaon" missile system providing "Standard-6" launch capability, and the THAAD missile defense system, collectively guarding Guam.

However, the U.S. military suspended the development of the critical AN/TPY-6 radar in the system during the Trump administration. In a memorandum sent to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) on January 7, the then U.S. Department of Defense announced the suspension of radar development.

According to a report released by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks instructed the termination of all further development of the AN/TPY-6 radar.

Hicks' memo stated, "Further development of the AN/TPY-6 radar, apart from system testing work, will be terminated. MDA will prioritize using remaining funds for the Guam Aegis system to provide the minimum feasible Aegis C2 (command and control) and data link capabilities, enabling the 'Standard-6' (SM-6) missile to engage remotely through the LTAMDS (Low-Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor) system on AN/TPY-2 and LTAMDS."

Guam Defense System social media

AN/TPY-2 is an existing ground-based air defense and missile defense radar primarily used for early warning detection with the U.S. Army's THAAD missile defense system, but it can also serve as an independent sensor. LTAMDS (Low-Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor) is a new radar currently being developed by the U.S. Army, mainly as an upgraded sensor for the Patriot surface-to-air missile system.

"Joint Track Management Capability Bridge (JTMC)" refers to the existing Patriot system's command and control upgrade program, which aims to "address the full range of Chinese missile threats to Guam and achieve Joint Tactical Integrated Fire Control (JTIFC) capabilities to coordinate battle management, combat identification, and electronic protection."

Hicks suggested that the single AN/TPY-6 radar currently on the island, along with all related flight test equipment, be retained as an experimental asset to explore its potential for future operations.

Although the U.S. Government Accountability Office indicated at the time that the final decision regarding the cancellation of AN/TPY-6 radar development would be made after the Trump administration took office, four months have passed without any updates, indicating that the fate of the AN/TPY-6 radar remains undecided.

The U.S. government did not provide reasons for halting radar development nor disclosed more details. The AN/TPY-6 performed well in December last year during an interception test against a ballistic missile target within the joint missile defense system. There were no issues reported during the test. This test also marked the first end-to-end live-fire engagement supported by the radar.

"Lack of Personnel and Facilities"

The suspension of AN/TPY-6 radar development highlighted numerous unresolved issues in the defense work at this key West Pacific base, even if the U.S. government were to reverse its decision to cancel the development of the AN/TPY-6 radar, the island's missile defense system would still face many problems—such as logistical facilities. Moreover, the U.S. military has yet to resolve the integration and coordination issues among the sea, land, and air missile defense forces in the Guam region.

Although the U.S. aims to make Guam the most heavily defended territory in terms of air defense, GAO's recent report emphasized serious uncertainties regarding personnel and other infrastructure needs.

GAO's report stated, "The Department of Defense has established organizations to manage the deployment of GDS and designated the primary services responsible for maintenance and operation. However, the Department lacks a strategy to transfer responsibility to its leadership organizations. Therefore, the Department faces risks of delays in deploying GDS elements, as well as incomplete plans in terms of organization, training, personnel levels, and facilities."

Guam's outdoor container, operated by the U.S. Army on social media

The anti-missile forces on Guam include units from the U.S. Army, Air Force, and Navy. Thus, coordinating the Guam anti-missile system requires multi-service collaboration. Although the U.S. Army officially joined the Marianas Joint Area in February 2024, it has yet to determine its long-term strategy and therefore cannot jointly determine priorities with other services. Due to the lack of strategy, the Army may continue to face delays in project approvals and the risk of deploying additional personnel without the necessary logistics infrastructure.

The U.S. Department of Defense previously predicted that by 2027, 805 personnel would be needed to support GDS, and by 2031, this number would increase to 1,044. However, senior military officials from the Government Accountability Office said that the draft statement was merely a benchmark for military branches, as each service still needs to verify and fund these requirements. Since planning for GDS began in the 2022 fiscal year, the Department of Defense has yet to fully determine the required personnel numbers or complete the deployment schedule for GDS units.

All of this has had a cascading impact on the construction of new infrastructure to support GDS. The latest report from the Government Accountability Office also emphasized that the current infrastructure available to the U.S. Army's Task Force "Eagle Claw" (Talon) on Guam remains severely limited. Although these forces have been stationed on Guam since 2013 and have been operating and maintaining a THAAD system on the island.

Currently, the government accountability office indicates that the U.S. military's goal is to deploy the first elements of GDS by the 2027 fiscal year, consistent with previous statements by U.S. officials, with the entire system planned to be in place by the 2032 fiscal year. Any significant delay in this timeline could have greater consequences.

Since 2021, to counter Chinese missile threats, including the DF-26, the U.S. military has been planning to strengthen Guam's defense system in preparation for "large-scale high-end conflicts." Guam is a vital hub for U.S. Air Force and Navy operations in the Western Pacific and an important transit station for ground troops in the region. The U.S. military aims to protect key facilities on the island, including Andersen Air Base, Guam Naval Base, and the Marine Corps headquarters at Blazes, among others.

To date, the GDS plan has continued the U.S. military's preference for focusing on expanding active air defense and missile defense, as well as new concepts of distributed operations, rather than improving passive defenses, such as constructing new hardened aircraft shelters. Critics, including members of Congress, are increasingly warning that failing to invest in additional hardening infrastructure poses significant risks to U.S. forces, especially in the event of a high-end conflict in the Pacific region.

The War Zone concluded that regardless of the current fate of the AN/TPY-6 radar, the U.S. military clearly has a lot of work to do to make Guam as resilient as possible against growing aerial and missile threats.

This article is an exclusive contribution from Observer Network and unauthorized reproduction is prohibited.

Original source: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7509419719322960396/

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