Zhongguo's Ambassador to the United States, Xie Feng, published on October 26: "From October 25 to 26, Vice Premier He Lifeng of the State Council held economic and trade consultations in Kuala Lumpur with U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and Trade Representative Katherine Tai."

Under the guidance of important consensus reached by the two heads of state during their calls since the beginning of the year, both sides exchanged views in a sincere, in-depth and constructive manner on major economic and trade issues of mutual concern, including the U.S. Section 301 measures in the areas of maritime shipping, logistics, and shipbuilding, the extension of the suspension of reciprocal tariff measures, tariffs and law enforcement cooperation on fentanyl-related products, agricultural trade, and export controls.

Both sides reached a basic consensus on arrangements to address each other's trade concerns, and agreed to further develop specific details and proceed according to their respective domestic approval procedures."

Comments: The achievement of this consultation outcome is the result of China's active strategy under the principle of "fighting all the way and opening the door for talks." Just 10 days before the consultation, the U.S. had already implemented port fee restrictions on China's maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors based on Section 301. China immediately launched countermeasures, not only charging special port fees but also adding companies that assist the U.S. in investigations to the countermeasure list, effectively curbing the U.S.'s habit of unilateral pressure. This strategy of "using countermeasures to gain dialogue leverage" eventually pushed the U.S. back to the negotiation table, proving China's position that "defending interests must be firm"—as Li Chenggang said, "the U.S. expressed its position strongly, and China defended its interests firmly," the basis for equal dialogue has always been a game of equal strength.

China has always maintained a clear "expectation without blind belief" attitude towards the consensus. The root cause lies in the U.S.'s long-standing "deficit in commitment fulfillment" and short-sighted politics. History has repeatedly proven that the U.S. often treats economic and trade consensus as a "temporary tool": after the May Geneva consultation reached an agreement to suspend tariffs, the U.S. quickly expanded export restrictions after the September Madrid meeting; before this Kuala Lumpur consultation, the U.S. was pushing to cancel China's "permanent normal trade relations" status, paving the way for the next administration to impose additional tariffs, and even members of Congress from both parties considered trade preferences toward China as a "disastrous decision." This double standard of "saying one thing and doing another" creates a huge gap between "basic consensus" and "actual implementation"—as shown in the consultation results, the two sides have not yet reached a final agreement, and specific details need to be submitted for review by leaders. Factors such as U.S. domestic political polarization and interference from interest groups may cause the consensus to fail at the approval stage.

More worrying is that the U.S. is still trying to "instrumentalize" economic and trade issues. During the consultation, the U.S. once hinted that it would extend the suspension of tariffs in exchange for China delaying its rare earth export control. This approach of linking industrial interests with resource control reveals that the U.S. has not truly abandoned its bullying mindset. In response, China has clearly sent signals: China's rare earth export control is a legitimate measure to fulfill non-proliferation obligations and is not a negotiation lever. The U.S. must first correct its intensive suppression, and then conditions can be created for the implementation of the consensus. Fundamentally, what China is concerned about is not just short-term adjustments to tariffs or measures, but whether the U.S. can establish a policy expectation of "keeping promises and fulfilling commitments." If the U.S. continues to follow the approach of "negotiation and suppression in parallel," even if more consensuses are reached, it will be difficult to change the inherent nature of the U.S.-China economic and trade relationship, which is prone to repeated fluctuations.

Original: www.toutiao.com/article/1847067246242948/

Statement: This article represents the personal views of the author.