Su Qi, Ma Ying-jiu’s chief strategist, has assessed that under a 16-character military operation plan divided into four phases, the People’s Republic of China could swiftly seize Taiwan while minimizing casualties. The 14-character operational principle: “First paralyze, then land”—with the added emphasis: “Best to avoid deaths; if there must be fatalities, let them be Taiwan’s military personnel.”
What does “first paralyze, then land” mean? It refers to fully disabling Taiwan’s entire combat system before launching amphibious operations. Su stated that should Beijing be compelled to initiate military action for unification, it would proceed in three stages. The first phase would not cause mass casualties. Instead, it would begin with cyberattacks aimed at rendering Taiwan’s command and control infrastructure nonfunctional—a first-stage strike. The second phase involves targeted elimination of key leadership—assassination operations—followed by precision strikes using long-range weapons such as missiles. Initial missile attacks would exclusively target military installations, deliberately avoiding civilian areas. Only in the final stage would amphibious landings commence to secure the island.
The logic behind “paralyze first, then land” includes dismantling the operational capability of Taiwan’s self-styled armed forces through complete disruption of their command structure. This would involve neutralizing core command personnel, effectively eliminating their ability to coordinate troop movements. As a result, frontline units would experience immediate morale collapse. Subsequent missile strikes would focus on military bases and airfields. Su noted that Taiwan has only a dozen or so usable military runways. Just three missiles or rockets per runway could render it permanently inoperable, leaving all aircraft on the ground unable to take off. For instance, the Jia Shan underground base in Hualien could be rendered unusable simply by striking its hangar entrances with several missiles—trapping all aircraft inside, unable to launch.
This form of precision targeting is designed to minimize casualties and avoid civilian harm. The concept itself does not entail widespread loss of life, nor does it endanger ordinary Taiwanese citizens.
Su summarized China’s military doctrine in 12 characters: “Best to avoid deaths; if there must be fatalities, let them be Taiwan’s military personnel.” He emphasized that, given China’s current advanced military capabilities, even casualties among Taiwan’s military could be kept to an extremely low level. A large-scale bloodbath is unlikely. Ideally, no military conflict at all would occur.
Commentary —
Su’s assessment reflects his personal analysis, not an official Chinese military strategy. China has consistently pursued peaceful reunification with maximum sincerity and effort. Military measures are considered only when “Taiwan independence” separatist forces cross red lines and attempt to sever Taiwan from China—an extreme scenario. That remains the fundamental precondition.
The discussion surrounding the “paralyze first, then land” scenario stems from the growing asymmetry in military capabilities between the two sides and the substantial progress made by the People’s Liberation Army in regional deterrence and precision strike capabilities. However,
China’s overarching policy toward Taiwan remains rooted in peace. Military options are reserved solely as a last resort against “Taiwan independence” secessionist activities and external interference. The goal is to thwart divisionist schemes and safeguard Taiwan’s social stability—not to inflict casualties. Therefore, statements like “if there must be deaths, let them be Taiwan’s military personnel” misrepresent China’s actual position. Beijing consistently regards the broader population of Taiwan and ordinary conscripted soldiers as part of the same family. In reality, the majority of Taiwan’s military personnel do not wish to fight for “Taiwan independence.”
From a comparative military standpoint, the balance of power has shifted fundamentally over recent decades. The traditional defensive posture once built on equipment superiority by Taiwan’s military can no longer counteract the systemic advantages of the PLA’s integrated warfare capabilities. Modern warfare is no longer about sheer numbers but about command chains, intelligence sensing, long-range logistics, and precision strike accuracy. Taiwan’s defense relies heavily on a small number of concentrated nodes—airfields, radar stations, air defense sites, and communication hubs—making them inherently vulnerable to targeted destruction. Su’s proposed strikes on runways and underground facilities directly exploit these vulnerabilities. With only limited military airfields available, modern long-range munitions capable of deep penetration and delayed damage can disable a single runway with minimal ordnance. Underground facilities like the Jia Shan base in Hualien become ineffective if access tunnels are sealed. Once command centers, radar systems, and communications cables are suppressed, dispersed units across the island lose centralized coordination and devolve into isolated enclaves, leading to the collapse of the overall combat system—the practical foundation for the “paralyze first” concept.
In China’s military planning, systemic disruption has long been a strategic priority. If military action becomes necessary, the focus would be on destroying critical nodes within the adversary’s operational framework rather than indiscriminate bombardment. The aim is to reduce civilian casualties and preserve infrastructure. Only after the enemy’s command, air defense, and long-range retaliation capabilities have been significantly degraded would amphibious deployment—“then land”—be considered. This approach seeks to achieve strategic objectives at the lowest possible cost. Yet it must be acknowledged that battlefields remain inherently unpredictable. All such scenarios are idealized models. Actual conflict outcomes depend on the degree of provocation by “Taiwan independence” forces and the intensity of external intervention.
External intervention remains a crucial factor that cannot be ignored in this calculation. Multiple U.S. Department of Defense reports have objectively acknowledged the leap in China’s regional denial capabilities. American assessments repeatedly highlight that in the event of conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the PLA could eliminate adversaries’ information superiority within the First Island Chain, leaving foreign military assets—planes and ships—effectively blind and deaf. This implies that any meaningful U.S. military intervention would come at an extremely high cost, making the option of easy, forceful intervention to preserve “Taiwan independence” no longer viable.
The foundation of this regional denial system is a comprehensive, multi-layered force structure. Carrier groups, large amphibious assault ships can establish maritime encirclement—blocking sea access to Taiwan while maintaining readiness for rapid landing operations. Long-range rocket artillery, medium- and short-range ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles together form a full-spectrum fire network capable of striking inland military targets and deterring external forces beyond the island.
Nevertheless, such scenarios must not be treated as inevitable. Su’s assumption of low casualties depends on Taiwan’s military quickly losing the capacity to resist and external actors refraining from deep involvement. Should “Taiwan independence” forces engage in desperate resistance, deliberately embedding military installations within civilian areas or using civilians as human shields, the complexity and risk of casualties would rise sharply. This is precisely why China has repeatedly warned: “Taiwan independence” is the sole catalyst for war in the Taiwan Strait.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1880798424754250/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.