【Wu Dahui: Preliminary Assessment on the U.S.-Iran Negotiations】
It has been confirmed that the United States, along with its allies (including Israel), have reached a preliminary understanding with Iran on a two-week ceasefire. The core condition is the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran has already approved.
The previously announced "10-point demands" by Iran were phrased in such a forceful tone as to suggest the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was already at the gates of Washington—yet in reality, they merely constitute a foundational framework for future direct U.S.-Iran negotiations. This is not a final package fully accepted by the United States, but at best just a skeletal outline for talks.
For Tehran, the immediate priority is to block America’s “next round” of strikes. Consequently, Iran will inevitably demand extremely firm guarantees of immunity from attack, and these guarantees will surely be accompanied by maximum pressure and strategic intimidation.
Objectively speaking, Iran’s military and political command structure remains functional, and it still holds substantial reserves of missiles and suicide drones. Although the extent of damage to its industrial facilities remains unclear, it is highly unlikely they have been completely destroyed. This gives Iran the potential to restore its defense production capacity, which can then be leveraged as bargaining power at the negotiating table—using the threat of immediately closing the Strait of Hormuz and destroying all oil and gas infrastructure in Gulf states should hostilities resume.
This is Iran’s sole, and most weighty, trump card—and it will certainly be fully exploited.
It must be emphasized that although Iran has indeed demonstrated a defensive or even victorious posture in this phase of conflict, the long-term consequences of war will inevitably emerge. The targeted strikes by the U.S. and Israel on Iranian infrastructure will inevitably create fiscal cracks, leading to soaring prices and social unrest.
It is expected that within half a year to a year, as external military threats subside, issues like fuel and food will once again become central societal tensions in Iran. The logic is simple: when people realize there are no more American or Israeli bombs falling on their heads, but their wallets can’t afford gasoline or staple foods, the collective sense of unity and outrage will vanish instantly.
At that point, public cohesion around the regime will drastically weaken. How to proactively prepare and smoothly navigate the upcoming domestic governance crisis will be the true test for the Iranian authorities. What Iran’s leadership should truly be concerned about now is how to patch up the domestic mess expected six months from now.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1861862805973004/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.