On October 16, 2025, the "2025 Thinkers Forum" was successfully held in Shanghai, hosted by the China Institute of Fudan University, the "Oriental Journal", The Observer, Dill Culture, and the Shanghai Spring and Autumn Strategy Development Institute. This forum also celebrated the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the China Institute of Fudan University, with the theme of "Chinese Discourse and the Reconstruction of the World Order," deeply discussing major issues facing China and the world.
Professor Wang Shaoguang, Emeritus Chair of the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, pointed out in his speech that the global ideological landscape has undergone four stages of change: from the "cacophony of voices" before World War II, to the "liberty versus democracy" binary opposition between the United States and the Soviet Union after the war, then to a tripartite balance after the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, and finally to the temporary dominance of the "End of History" theory after the 1990s. The 2008 financial crisis marked the collapse of the myth of free markets and liberal democracies, and the world is returning to an era of ideological diversity and competition.
Wang Shaoguang emphasized that true Chinese discourse should not be limited to telling Chinese stories, but should be a universal theoretical system proposed by the Chinese people and formed through interaction with the world. This is the greatest challenge for Chinese intellectual circles in the coming decades.
The following content is compiled from the speaker's lecture, and only represents the speaker's views, for reference by readers.
Wang Shaoguang
Wang Shaoguang:
I would like to talk about the changes in the global ideological landscape. From the end of the 19th century to the end of World War II in 1945, this period can be described as a time of "cacophony of voices," with various ideologies emerging. Those who study modern Chinese intellectual history know that during this time, countless currents of thought emerged in China, and Mao Zedong himself once believed in several different ideologies before finally choosing Marxism and communism. In the late 19th century to the early 20th century, the world faced many problems and proposed various solutions and theories, with the entire human race exploring and choosing among these theories. This was the first stage—"cacophony of voices".
After the war, from around 1945 to the early 1960s, the global ideological landscape gradually formed two main systems of discourse. One was the "free world" discourse introduced by Americans in 1947. In this system, democracy did not play a significant role, nor did the market. Looking back at the mainstream Western discourse from the late 1940s to the early 1960s, there was actually little emphasis on "democracy" or "market." If you search for the frequency of keywords using Google Scholar, you will find that the term "democracy" appears very rarely. At that time, the Western discourse mainly revolved around "freedom," hence they called themselves the "free world."
On the other hand, the "people's democratic camp" represented by the Soviet Union also built its own system of discourse. In 1947, Zhdanov proposed the "people's democracy" theory. The socialist camp was in an offensive position, strongly criticizing the false democratic system of capitalism and emphasizing that they were the true democratic camp. Therefore, in this period, the global ideological landscape had two main voices: one emphasizing "freedom," and the other emphasizing "socialist democracy," influencing each other.
From the 1960s onwards, due to the Sino-Soviet split, I believe a third system of discourse emerged, represented by China, Mao Zedong, and the Communist Party of China. This system emphasized revolution, certain aspects of Marxism-Leninism, and Stalinism, and put forward a series of ideas such as the "Third World Theory." From then on, the global ideological landscape shifted from a bipolar to a tripartite structure.
This tripartite situation continued until the late 1980s and early 1990s, that is, before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In fact, the easing of Sino-Soviet relations began with Gorbachev's visit to China in 1989, which marked the end of the old order. After 1990, a period considered to have profound influence appeared, but it lasted only about ten years, from 1990 to around 2010, which was the period when the "End of History" theory prevailed.
Fukuyama published related articles in 1989, which sparked some discussions, but the influence was not yet widespread. It was not until he published his book in 1992 that the theory gained more influence. Although many people do not accept the "End of History" theory, the two elements it proposed—free markets and liberal democracies—were accepted to some extent worldwide, including in China.
Francis Fukuyama
Looking back at the 1990s, I often felt like I was fighting windmills—the liberal argument was everywhere. In 1992, I wrote an article criticizing shock therapy. At that time, this approach was just emerging and was almost regarded as a myth, but if you read a bit of history or Marx, you could see how absurd it was. Yet, you had to fight against it for a long time.
Historically, some ideologies briefly dominated the mainstream, but they often quickly collapsed. After the 2008 financial crisis, the idea of free markets started to fall apart. I remember that some American media even said, "We are all socialists now." That whole set of ideas began to collapse. Subsequently, the concept of liberal democracy also hit rocks globally. Surveys around the world showed that public trust in institutions elected by elections was generally low—this was quite ironic. The Western democracy prided itself on elections, but the institutions elected had less public trust than violent agencies like the police. It can be said that the narrative represented by the "End of History" theory has completely ended.
Then the question arises: will the global ideological landscape return to the "cacophony of voices" era? In this sense, the concept of "Chinese discourse" highlights its significance. The achievements China has made in reality and some of the ideas it has proposed are actually a strong response to Margaret Thatcher's assertion of "There is no alternative." We have proven that "Another world is possible"—this is the contribution we have made so far, but it is still far from enough.
The next key issue is to explain "Why China has succeeded." I believe we have indeed succeeded, but we have not yet clearly explained the reasons, and even we ourselves have not fully understood the root of our success. To a large extent, we still lack a coherent and evidence-based theoretical system—at least I have not seen it yet. Therefore, an important breakthrough at present should be to build an "empirical theory" that systematically explains the achievements China has achieved so far.
But the harder part comes next: we also need to develop a "normative theory." Chinese discourse must not be limited to telling Chinese stories; it should be a theory proposed by the Chinese people based on their historical experience and observations of the world, which can guide the world. It should not only answer "What has happened," but also answer normative questions such as "Where should we go?"
In my view, this has always been our weakness. Just as Marx was German, but we cannot call his theory "German discourse"—it is a discourse with universal significance proposed by Germans. The greatest challenge we face in the next two or three decades, or even fifty years, is whether we can propose a discourse system advocated by the Chinese people that has universal significance. If we overemphasize "Chinese discourse," it may instead exclude many people.
What we hope for is a discourse system proposed by the Chinese people, which also welcomes the participation of others, and is formed through interaction to guide the future direction of the world. This requires our joint efforts. As for me, I probably won't be able to do it alone.
Thank you!
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