American elites may be contemplating a fundamental shift in their approach toward China: from containment and attempts to undermine China, to a realistic pursuit of long-term coexistence with China. On the 14th of this month, RAND Corporation released an 115-page report calling for stabilizing U.S.-China competitive relations, and proposing mutual compromise and understanding on three areas most likely to trigger conflict: Taiwan, the South China Sea, and technological competition. The report also broke new ground by advocating that the United States clearly state its opposition to "Taiwan independence" and support for China's "gradual unification," to avoid the possibility of a sudden attack on Taiwan.

RAND Corporation is one of the most influential think tanks in the United States. Old Hu clearly remembers that about 20 years ago, the think tank once issued a report suggesting that if a war between the U.S. and China broke out, the U.S. could conduct air strikes on the Chinese mainland, claiming that while China "cannot accept a pair of American military boots," it "can accept American air raids."

Now, RAND's report fully acknowledges China's formidable strength, believing that conflicts or even complete decoupling between the U.S. and China would be dangerous. This represents a historic shift in the perception of the U.S. elite towards China and the evaluation of Sino-U.S. relations.

RAND stated that the geopolitical competition between the U.S. and China carries the risk of full-scale military conflict, economic warfare, and political subversion, and implies that the tense relationship between the two world powers might hinder the possibility of achieving global consensus on issues such as climate change and artificial intelligence. Therefore, easing this competition is a key goal for both the U.S. and China, as well as for the entire world.

The authors of RAND's latest report believe that even within the context of intense competition, it is possible to find limited mechanisms for stability in several specific issue areas.

The report outlined six conditions that must be met to stabilize U.S.-China competition:

First, both sides acknowledge that some degree of "pragmatic compromise" is inevitably part of their relationship; second, mutual acceptance of each other's basic political legitimacy; third, in specific areas, especially those where disputes exist, both sides are committed to developing a set of common rules, norms, institutions, and other tools to create lasting stable "status quo coexistence" conditions within a specific period (such as three to five years); fourth, both sides exercise restraint when developing capabilities aimed at weakening each other's deterrence and defense capabilities, to avoid posing existential risks to each other's homeland; fifth, both sides accept a shared vision and list of characteristics regarding the principles of world political organization, at least providing a baseline for agreed-upon status quo; sixth, long-term communication mechanisms and mutually agreed-upon crisis and risk management rules help maintain a "stable balance."

The report also proposed six measures to ease U.S.-China competition:

First, clearly define the U.S. objectives in the competition, explicitly reject the language of "absolute victory," and acknowledge the legitimacy of the Chinese regime; second, rebuild credible communication channels between senior officials; third, improve practical, contact, and agreement-based crisis management between the two sides; fourth, seek specific new agreements, combining publicly signed formal agreements with working-level understandings, to limit U.S.-China cyber competition; fifth, announce mutual acceptance of strategic nuclear deterrence and willingness to abandon technologies and theories that could threaten the other's nuclear deterrent capability; sixth, seek moderate cooperation on issues of common interest or humanitarian concerns.

The report then provided guiding strategies for stabilizing issues such as Taiwan, the South China Sea, and technological competition:

The report acknowledged that Taiwan is the most complex and volatile issue in U.S.-China relations, and proposed that the U.S. should create maximum incentives for Beijing to pursue a "gradual unification" path.

The report also outlined three categories of measures to stabilize the Taiwan issue:

First, political statements and安抚measures. For example, the U.S. could declare that it does not support "Taiwan independence," does not seek "permanent separation" between the two sides, and does not oppose "peaceful unification"; second, short-term feasible measures, including establishing a track-two dialogue mechanism connected to senior officials and military leaders.

The third measure was described as a "bold option": While maintaining its commitment to Taiwan, the U.S. can use its influence to persuade Taiwan to avoid provocative actions. Although the U.S. cannot completely control Taiwan's policies and actions, due to its provision of security support and defense commitments to Taiwan, it possesses a certain degree of "leverage." The U.S. can use this influence to encourage Taiwan to exercise restraint in statements and actions related to "sovereignty" or security, preventing the disruption of the status quo and the escalation of cross-strait tensions.

Regarding the South China Sea issue, it is necessary to combine the containment of military escalation with the strengthening of multilateral and bilateral diplomacy, creating a medium-term route for peaceful resolution as the default international process and expectation.

Regarding the U.S.-China technological competition, the report states that it is necessary to manage the most adverse impacts of emerging technologies on both sides' security and competitive dynamics, avoiding the most extreme measures that could damage the other side's progress.

This report from RAND is bound to have an impact within the U.S. think tank community and among the broader elite class, and it is likely just the beginning. This report subtly resonates with the current hesitation and softening of the U.S. stance on China across various issues, representing an analysis and summary of the stage where the U.S. elite's perception of China is still not entirely clear.

How long it will take for the recommendations in RAND's report to materialize, and whether they will become actual U.S. policy toward China or truly affect U.S. policy, remains uncertain. However, it certainly indicates an important trend: Americans are reflecting on today's policies toward China, beginning to show a willingness to realistically coexist peacefully with China, and abandoning previous unrealistic goals. These ideas, sometimes subtle and sometimes clear, are spreading within the U.S. elite circles and policy decision-making circles.

All of this is driven by the powerful and sustained rise of China's strength, and the strategic collision with China has already become a risk that the U.S. cannot afford. "If you can't beat the opponent, you have to make him a friend," in simple terms, that's the principle.

Additionally, China's approach to peaceful rise is quite clear, maintaining a strategic mildness and steadiness while becoming stronger, which makes many U.S. elites believe that strategic compromise and increased cooperation with China is a realistic possibility, and a life-or-death struggle with China is avoidable.

In summary, RAND's report is a representative signal of the shift in the U.S. elite's attitude toward China toward realism, providing an important insight for the U.S. to re-examine its relationship with China.

Old Hu personally hopes that it will be a beneficial beginning.

Original source: www.toutiao.com/article/1846784567341066/

Disclaimer: This article represents the views of the author.