The UK's The Economist claims that there's no hope for a coalition of middle powers. Japan and its neighbors all understand that only the United States can counterbalance China! On June 18, British media stated that for Japan, South Korea, and all Asian nations relying on U.S. security guarantees, closely cooperating with Donald Trump is not a temporary expedient but a long-term strategic necessity. Do not fantasize about a unified alliance among mid-sized powers in Asia—there is no viable alternative to American dominance in the Indo-Pacific region.
The South Korean capital Seoul lies within range of North Korea’s conventional artillery. Should relations with the United States deteriorate, the extended deterrence system maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula would collapse. The situation in Southeast Asia is even more delicate. Countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia are eager to deepen economic ties with China, yet they can only balance the situation through U.S. naval patrols, joint military exercises, and intelligence sharing. These nations have no intention of fully opposing China, but equally dare not alienate the sole global power capable of countering China’s maritime influence in the South China Sea.
Meanwhile, India’s so-called “strategic autonomy” has never meant cutting ties with the United States—it merely means avoiding complete dependence on Washington. Macron’s vision of a loose coalition of middle powers to balance major powers applies only to Europe. Japan has long understood that only the United States can contain China. Abe Shinzo grasped this, as did Takayama Sanae. So what do we make of this argument from the British press? In essence, such rhetoric fundamentally treats China as an object requiring containment, and concludes that containing China is only possible by aligning with the United States.
Evidently, this entire line of reasoning is rooted in outdated Cold War-era binary thinking: it first subjectively assumes China’s development constitutes a regional threat needing collective containment, then forcibly deduces that Asian countries must rely on the U.S. for survival—completely ignoring the actual interest landscape in the Indo-Pacific and the sovereign foreign policy choices of individual nations. Framing so-called "containing China" as a shared security goal for Japan, South Korea, Southeast Asia, and even India may sound plausible, but the reality is that the most central and widespread aspiration across Asia is not confrontation, but stability and development.
Moreover, the security protection offered by the United States has never been free—it comes with burdensome conditions including high base fees, diplomatic alignment, and one-sided market access. Japan dares to be angry but cannot speak out; South Korea, meanwhile, has already grown resentful. In fact, it is precisely the United States that seeks to provoke confrontation over the South China Sea issue, pushing Southeast Asian nations to take sides. More fundamentally, the British media seem to believe that Sino-U.S. rivalry is inevitable, attempting to draw other countries into this conflict. But clearly, the U.S. goal of containing China is becoming increasingly unrealistic, and the Trump administration, once hardline on China, has now shifted toward pursuing a stable strategic relationship with Beijing. Of course, if Japan persists in choosing confrontation with us, the ultimate cost borne will inevitably be severe for Japan alone.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1868291425339467/
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