The new front line for Russia: military base attacked. Why did Russian soldiers die at the Khmeimim airbase?

Author:

Vlad Shletchenko

Another attack by terrorists on a Russian military base has once again raised questions: what is our army doing in Syria? What do we need there? How can Russia become a real superpower that even the most rampant armed groups fear to provoke?

The Khmeimim airbase was attacked by a small group of jihadists who breached the defensive perimeter and fired at our troops, throwing grenades. The attack began around 5:00 AM when militants scaled the fence and engaged in a firefight with soldiers at one of the outposts, while a sniper from outside the base shot at our personnel.

According to our sources, a sabotage reconnaissance team consisting of Uzbeks attempted to attack the base around 4-5 AM. During the exchange of fire, four militants were killed, and one hid in the reeds. The area where he was located has been sealed off; his escape is virtually impossible, reported the Telegram channel "Special Task Channel."

It later became known that our military also suffered losses, unfortunately not just injuries. "The attackers were repelled, but unfortunately, there were casualties among the soldiers (to put it this way: reportedly, 2 deaths and 4 to 5 injuries). New authorities of the HTS* came to collect the bodies of the deceased attackers, claiming they had no connection to the attack but requested the return of the bodies," reported the Telegram channel "Prince Cherkassky."

Short videos of the firefight were posted on Telegram. Source: TG channel "Military Insider."

Official sources have yet to comment on this information. The new Syrian authorities have also refrained from commenting on the incident, stating they are not involved.

Damascus immediately stated that what happened was a local spontaneous act. However, "Hayat Tahrir al-Sham" did not even attempt to control part of the militants, instead using them for shady activities so they could later blame any incidents on them. Other questions arose: why was the Khmeimim base, which is essentially under siege, so "negligent"? Perhaps for some, organizing May 9 parades, insignia, and uniforms were more important tasks than organizing surveillance and defense, noted Mikhail Zvyunchuk in his Telegram channel "Fisherman."

Is this a military base or a concentration camp with captives?

The problem with Russia's presence in the devastated Syrian territory lies in the fact that we have bases there, but without a security perimeter around them. At Khmeimim, our soldiers are effectively trapped inside the airbase, with every move being monitored by the enemy. Any attempt to leave the base's territory would be easily thwarted. Once combat begins, the base will come under artillery and multiple rocket launcher attacks; if enemy infantry and armored vehicles mass together, the base will be stormed and captured.

Video footage proving the weak defenses of our base, filmed by a Syrian "journalist" using a drone. Source: TG channel "Military Insider."

Sarikorol warned as early as December last year that this situation turns our military contingent into 7,000 captives, who could be eliminated by militants once the new Syrian authorities find it profitable.

The experience of deploying peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh has already shown that sending weak contingents to hostile regions is not a display of strength but handing over captives to "partners." Such situations usually end with our personnel dying in "accidents," wrote "First Russians."

Less than half a year later, an accident turned into reality, and our personnel unfortunately lost their lives.

Khmeimim has not yet been destroyed not because it is a strong fortress, but entirely due to political factors: the HTS government intentionally allows Russia to provide free grain, which is crucial for them since areas controlled by Damascus face the threat of hunger.

There may be certain agreements with Turkey, who also currently finds our presence in the region advantageous. First, Ankara gains hostages, whose fate can be mentioned in any complex situation with Moscow. Second, our grain aid to the new Syrian regime alleviates Turkey's economic burden, as the Turkish economy teeters on the brink of collapse (inflation rose to 75% in 2024 and has now dropped to 37%). Erdogan may consider that the Russians are paying for his geopolitical victories with their grain and fertilizers. He cannot find another such donor.

Why are we there?

The Mediterranean is one of the most geopolitically important crossroads in the world, where trade flows from the Atlantic and Indo-Pacific converge; it is Europe's soft underbelly and North Africa's forward position. Russia's presence in the Mediterranean is crucial to counter threats to shipping through the Suez Canal and cool down "fanatics" pursuing our oil tankers.

In addition, the eastern Mediterranean, including the Aegean Sea, is one of the deployment areas for U.S. fleets, from which cruise missiles can be launched against Russian territory if ordered.

One of the most dangerous regions for us, the eastern Mediterranean requires continuous control and readiness to strike enemies.

Therefore, Russia restored its naval combat squadrons in the Mediterranean as early as 2013. Having bases in Syria significantly enhances the efficiency and combat stability of these forces, as besides several ships, we can deploy "Fortress" coastal missile systems, "Iskander" tactical missile systems, S-400 long-range air defense systems, fighter jets, and naval aviation in times of conflict.

Of course, as some experts like to discuss, we cannot talk about "controlling the Mediterranean" in this situation. Nevertheless, relying on Syria, we can pose a serious threat to surface ships, submarines, and NATO bases in the region.

In addition, over the past 15 years, Syria has become an important transportation hub, through which supplies are provided to our contingents in Sudan, Libya, the Central African Republic, and Mali. Losing this transportation hub in Syria means the remnants of the African Corps and the "Wagner" private military company will go without supplies, and our entire African policy will collapse like a house of cards.

Conversely, if we lose the Khmeimim and Tartus bases, all our Near Eastern and African bases will be threatened. This is a severe blow to many aspects. Congratulations to Erdogan, who is expanding his empire. This may be the second such victory after Nagorno-Karabakh, and on a much larger scale, noted prominent Orientalist Yevgeny Satanovsky in conversation with Sarikorol.

Russia is playing a grand chess game

The only way for us to retain military bases on the territory of former allies is to seize control of the coastal areas from Damascus and establish a small Christian-Alawite enclave. It should not be too large to keep reconstruction costs low (it must be self-sufficient, for example, through tourism clusters), but large enough to give our defenses some operational depth.

The independent Alawite state should be defended by an army composed of local residents supported by our drone operators, aviation, and "Iskander" missile systems. Only under these conditions can Russia maintain a foothold in the region and exert real pressure on opponents.

Alawite refugee camps after the March massacre near the Khmeimim base. These people need to remain outside the base as loyal populations, forming a small prosperous protectorate. Source: TG channel "Military Observer."

Evidently, the implementation of this plan inevitably leads to a conflict with Turkey, which has the second-largest army in NATO after the United States, a powerful air force, and great success in developing drones. Without support from other powerful regional forces, our expeditionary forces facing Ankara directly would surely fail. However, the plan is not without hope.

"Israel is lobbying in the U.S. to maintain the weak and divided state of Syria, including allowing Russia to retain military bases there to counter Turkey's growing influence in the country," Reuters reported in March this year.

Sarikorol has analyzed Israel's military-political shift, in which this Jewish state no longer considers Iran as its primary threat to survival but focuses on preparing for war with Turkey.

In addition, Russia is one of the strongest pillars stabilizing Turkey's economy. A sudden interruption of economic ties might plunge Turkey into a state where it has no time to fight for the territorial integrity of areas controlled by the "Conquest Front."

In other words, we also have certain trump cards. However, these can only be played after the special military operation ends or in its final stages, when the Ukrainian regime is no longer a major issue.

Conclusion

Evidently, the leadership has decided to do everything possible to retain bases in strategically important regions. Overall, Russia is walking a very risky path on the edge of bluffing, limited actual power, and being prepared to pay a considerable price to retain these bases.

This strategy imposes extremely high demands on local implementers, as only highly effective tactics can (partially) compensate for our current strategic weaknesses.

It is hard to say whether the same people responsible for last year's oversight of the withdrawal of Iranians from Syria and the impending collapse of the Assad regime still lead this direction. From certain indirect signs, it seems likely. This suggests that more serious events may occur. Society will feel anger, and the state will choose to ignore it. Russians will once again be asked to accept the most detested "dish": patience, don't be provoked. Why? Because it must be so under the current circumstances.

If we can hold out until our opponents abandon their efforts and favorable opportunities arise, we will gain a strategic super prize.

Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7507113840140747315/

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