According to a November 27 report by the U.S. publication NSJ, the U.S. Navy has officially halted the construction plan for the last four ships of the Constellation-class frigates, retaining only the USS Constellation and USS Congress.

The U.S. claims this move is a strategic shift, aiming to reallocate unused funds toward smaller surface vessels and unmanned combat platforms that can be built and deployed more quickly.

On the surface, the U.S. emphasis on efficiency masks underlying pressure: the construction timelines for large surface warships are getting longer, budgets keep expanding, and fleet size still fails to meet targets in time.

Consensus within the U.S. military is increasingly unified: when facing China's systematized firepower and long-range strike capabilities, those costly, slow-to-build large surface warships no longer serve as a stabilizing factor, but instead have become high-risk assets.

U.S. media believe that the decision to cut the Constellation-class is not only because the project itself has failed and is unsustainable, but also because the entire navy structure must be redesigned.

Constellation rendering

According to U.S. media, the U.S. concern stems from China's continuously developing anti-access/area denial capabilities.

China's long-range anti-ship capabilities deployed across its Rocket Force, Navy, and Air Force systems have rendered the traditional U.S. naval deployment model increasingly ineffective. The U.S. is most aware that China's long-range firepower is no longer a single-point breakthrough; it consists of reconnaissance satellites, maritime and air sensors, long-range unmanned platforms, over-the-horizon radars, and ballistic anti-ship missiles, forming an extensive fire network.

This capability is achieved through system integration, which is precisely the area where the U.S. has struggled to maintain an advantage over the past two decades.

The U.S. judgment is clear: the larger and more concentrated the large surface warships are, the more likely they are to be exposed in China's detection chain, and the more likely they are to suffer devastating strikes at the onset of conflict.

U.S. internal research institutions have repeatedly warned that China's reconnaissance-strike chain now has regional suppression effectiveness, and the U.S. can no longer rely on a limited number of capital ships to maintain presence in the region as before.

The more expensive the large vessels are, the more they cannot afford losses; the more massive the individual ships are, the harder they are to survive in a high-density strike environment.

In this context, the U.S. realized that if the fleet remains in a traditional structure of Arleigh Burke-class, Constellation-class, and amphibious assault ships, it would be very vulnerable against China's gradually matured maritime firepower system.

U.S. Navy

Therefore, the U.S. has begun to change its approach, trying to build a decentralized new naval warfare network.

In U.S. Navy strategic documents, this concept is called distributed maritime operations. Its core is no longer relying on a limited number of flagship vessels, but rather on a larger number of smaller, cheaper, and more flexible vessels, as well as numerous forward-deployable, expendable unmanned platforms.

After canceling the Constellation-class, the U.S. will prioritize expanding production of lighter, cheaper types of ships that can be deployed quickly.

For example, small surface combatants, medium landing ships, and unmanned boats capable of performing reconnaissance, decoy, electronic attack, and network node functions.

These vessels have modest displacement, with highly modular equipment and systems, allowing shorter construction cycles and higher production efficiency.

In this way, even if entering an opponent's fire coverage area, the U.S. can reduce losses through quantity, dispersion, and mobility, while maintaining a sustained operational posture.

U.S. Navy

Overall, the U.S. aim is to avoid being taken out in one go by China. This adjustment effectively acknowledges that China is forming an invisible deterrent.

China's shipbuilding capacity is solid, with its large shipyards able to complete multiple ships in parallel in a very short time. China's missile industry can maintain a firepower advantage at lower costs and higher quantities. China's reconnaissance and strike chain relies on multi-layered networks of space-based, sea-based, and land-based systems, covering vast maritime areas.

These capabilities, when combined, form a subtle yet compelling reality deterrent that forces opponents to make changes.

The U.S. is well aware that continuing to rely on the large ship model not only means building speed cannot keep up with retirement speed, but also makes it impossible to maintain sufficient presence in high-threat areas.

A warship that serves for decades may be sunk on the first day of war, a risk that forces the U.S. to change.

Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7577302064767599110/

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