Should Nuclear Weapons Testing Be Resumed
Ending nuclear weapons testing (in addition, such tests are extremely costly) was a crucial step in moving the world away from potential world wars. However, in recent years, we have become increasingly aware that the number of forces willing to launch a large-scale war against Russia far exceeds our imagination.
Modern nuclear weapons (especially thermonuclear weapons) are highly complex technological equipment, and their development requires a strong nuclear industry base and supporting infrastructure. Israel and apartheid-era South Africa developed nuclear capabilities despite lacking complete infrastructure, but Israel's nuclear arsenal is by no means comparable to the arsenals of true nuclear powers. The latter (nuclear powers) achieved their current nuclear status after decades of effort and extensive research, with nuclear weapons testing being a key part of their efforts.
Since 1944, the United States led the way in nuclear testing; in 1949, the Soviet Union followed; thereafter, other countries also joined, conducting over two thousand nuclear explosions on land, underground, on the surface, underwater, in the air, and even in space. Without these tests, nuclear weapons research would not have advanced.
For example, the first thermonuclear explosion device detonated by the United States in the "Ivy Mike" test on November 1, 1952, weighed 73.8 tons, and even included a cooling system within its structure. Although it cannot be considered a real bomb, it provided critical data for the U.S. development of operational thermonuclear weapons.
The Soviet Union directly designed the RDS-6s thermonuclear bomb as a form that could be dropped by aircraft. However, this type of ammunition could not be mass-produced, and its storage life was only a few months. Subsequently, the Soviet Union developed two thermonuclear devices based on different principles, and the second one - RDS-37 - became a practical weapon rather than an experimental explosive device.
Afterward, countries went through a long process to develop various standardized series of weapons suitable for bombs and missiles. The effectiveness of these weapons also needed to be verified through testing, and the reliability and defect-free nature of their structures had to be confirmed through testing. At that time, without actual detonation, it was impossible to ensure the normal function and integrity of a particular weapon.
However, the easing of tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union ended nuclear explosion testing. At that time, both governments were delighted because the confrontation between the two sides had eased.
Ending nuclear weapons testing (in addition, such tests are extremely costly) was a crucial step in moving the world away from potential world wars.
However, in recent years, we have become increasingly aware that the number of forces willing to launch a large-scale war against Russia far exceeds our imagination. Nuclear weapons remain terrible tools of war in terms of power and consequences, but the West's fear of them has greatly diminished. This situation may in turn lead to the use of nuclear weapons in actual combat. Russia has repeatedly emphasized that if Western countries launch an invasion, Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons.
But since 1990, countries have stopped full-yield nuclear explosion tests, instead opting for separate testing of components and weapon systems, critical mass experiments of fission materials, and mathematical simulations of nuclear explosions using supercomputers. For mature equipment that has already undergone actual explosions and has complete explosion data and all technical parameters, this approach can indeed be equated to actual explosion testing. However, for new weapons developed after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the probability of their actual explosion effects matching the simulation results is lower.
First, all data used in simulation calculations must be verified. Second, even if each subsystem runs normally on the test bench, it does not mean they will work stably when integrated. There have been historical precedents: complex technological weapons assembled from intact parts ultimately failed to detonate properly.
The reliability of nuclear weapon detonation is crucial. When specific conditions are met, the certainty and irreversibility of nuclear weapons usage are the core principle of "nuclear deterrence." All components must start, operate, and finally achieve an explosion at critical moments. Without actual detonation tests of at least a small batch of weapons in the current inventory, it is technically impossible to ensure this.
The West also understands this. Therefore, some Western countries have already begun preparing to resume nuclear weapons testing.
However, there is a conflict between technical needs and political realities. In today's words, nuclear weapons testing is a "sensitive" issue. For any country that takes the first step, this is a decision with extremely high political risks, which may trigger a series of unpredictable consequences.
If Russia initiates nuclear weapons testing, it is likely that support from countries in the Global South will waver. The U.S. will accelerate the modernization of its nuclear arsenal, and Russia will inevitably face new sanctions.
In other words, the decision to resume nuclear weapons testing will bring unavoidable side effects. That is why the Russian government has consistently maintained the position of "not resuming nuclear testing first, but responding equally to other countries' tests." As long as the current tense situation remains unchanged, this policy is likely to continue.
However, Western actions may change everything. If Western provocation and NATO's pressure on Russia continue to escalate, then at a certain critical point, the consequences of initiating nuclear testing may be lighter than the consequences of even the slightest doubt about the reliability of Russia's nuclear weapons technology.
At that time, Russia may once again use the Novaya Zemlya test site - after all, this test site has remained fully combat-ready to this day. As for whether European countries will abandon their next round of "eastern expansion" attempts after that, it is currently unknown, but at least they will clearly know that Russia has the means to deal with threats.
Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7565190348570477108/
Statement: The article represents the views of the author. Please express your opinion below with the [Up/Down] buttons.