【By Observer Net Columnist Chen Feng】
On November 25, the US Navy Secretary announced that the "Constellation" class frigate program would be canceled, with the two already under construction continuing, while the rest were directly canceled.
The "Constellation" has a distinguished position in the history of the US Navy. The first "Constellation" was built in 1797 and was named by President Washington himself, being one of the earliest six frigates of the US Navy. Not only was it larger and more powerful than the mainstream frigates of Europe at that time, but it also played a significant role in the fight against the Barbary pirates.
The fourth "Constellation" was the second ship of the "Kitty Hawk" class aircraft carrier, nicknamed "Connie," which served as the main unit of the Seventh Fleet during the Vietnam War, routinely conducting combat missions in the Gulf of Tonkin and off the coast of Vietnam. When 9/11 occurred, the "Constellation" had already been withdrawn from the combat fleet, sailing with families according to naval tradition, heading for San Diego to retire. At that time, there was even an idea to return to Pearl Harbor immediately, but eventually continued the voyage, arrived at San Diego as planned, and quickly returned to combat status, heading to the Middle East to participate in the Second Iraq War, and returned to the United States in the spring of the following year to retire triumphantly.
The fifth "Constellation" was the lead ship of the "Constellation" class frigate under construction. However, this time, the "Constellation" fell, leaving the US Navy not with brilliance, but with sorrow.
It must be said that the US Navy is encountering bad luck. After the Cold War, they won several easy victories, but in terms of equipment development, nothing has been done right. As the saying goes, the road to hell is paved with good intentions, and the devil is in the details. The US Navy's ship design history after the Cold War is a perfect interpretation of these two sayings.
At the end of the Cold War, the US Navy faced two major problems:
The Soviet threat disappeared, but the Chinese threat was still on the horizon, making a fully high-end fleet structure too extravagant.
The threat of war disappeared, but the task of being a world policeman increased, making the number of fleets insufficient.
At that time, it was actually a golden age for the US Navy, with 13 carriers, 6 nuclear-powered "Nimitz" class already built, and 4 more under construction or planned, one nuclear-powered "Enterprise" class still in service, and 5 conventional carriers that could dominate the world, one of which was specifically reserved as a training carrier.
There were also 27 "Ticonderoga" class cruisers representing the highest level in the world, with the first five using the Mk26 dual-launch tilting system, and the remaining 22 using the Mk41 vertical launch system, with the AN/SPY1 phased array radar and combat command system being the same. A dozen "Arleigh Burke" class destroyers had already entered service, becoming the benchmark for Western high-end destroyers for the next 30 years.
For "foreseeable" opponents, these warships were pure overkill. But there was no big war, only small wars constantly, and the US Navy urgently needed a large number of low-cost, multi-purpose ships to carry out police tasks around the world, preventing flies from turning into tigers. The "Perry" class frigates were originally suitable, but their age was long, and they started to retire. On the other hand, the Gulf conflict reminded the danger of mine warfare, and the US Navy urgently needed to fill this gap.
Moreover, over time, the problem of aging and insufficient number of the US Navy's fleet was exacerbated, compared to the rapid growth of the Chinese Navy, small problems became big ones, and rebuilding the fleet number became the top priority. Under this context, the "Constellation" class frigate made a dazzling debut.
The current non-nuclear powered US Navy shipbuilding facilities
To avoid the problem of technologically overambitious and overconfident positioning, the "Constellation" class frigate initially determined the principle of "shelf technology" and returned to traditional frigates in positioning. After looking left and right, it finally decided to base the "Constellation" class frigate on the Italian version of the French-Italian FREMM (European Multi-Mission Frigate) class, launching the "Constellation" class frigate program. It was expected to build 20 ships in the first batch, constructed by the Marinette Shipyard, whose parent company Fincantieri was the company that built the FREMM class in Italy. According to the US Navy's plan, the final number could reach 30-40.
This was also an era of US defense procurement reform, attempting to use mature technology, quick start, and mass production to reduce costs.
The maturity of "shelf technology" is high, and the FREMM has already been in service, so the obvious effect of avoiding risks and reducing costs is evident.
Quick start can avoid the design requirements and adopted technologies gradually increasing in the process of prolonged delays, leading to a series of design and construction cross iterations causing schedule delays and cost increases. Now is an era of rapid technological development, and China's explosive rise brings great pressure. The previous era where just the design requirements would take ten years is over, and the fleet cannot wait. The baseline point of the plan may need to be reconsidered in ten years.
As for mass production, it is not just a commitment in the plan, but also requires the implementation of "multi-year bulk purchases." The benefits of bulk orders are obvious; early locked-in bulk contracts can reduce the risk for both the military and the contractor, encouraging the contractor to invest confidently, expand manpower, and improve manufacturing facilities. In the F-35 program, the early low-speed production each year had the intention of improving while producing, but it also brought the problem of small volume and lack of economies of scale. After changing to a multi-year bulk purchase (multi-year block buy), the unit price dropped significantly.
These are new measures brought about by years of failure lessons, but the US Navy still unintentionally stepped into the pit it intended to avoid - although not directly stepping in, it still did so in a twisted way, ultimately irreversibly leading to the failure of the "Constellation" class.
As a navy of a major power, the frigate needs to join the carrier battle group or the surface combat group led by cruisers and large destroyers, serving as escort for the fleet, with higher requirements for fleet air defense and networked operations, rather than just being able to work independently and show presence.
The "Constellation" class needs to be equipped with the Aegis Baseline 10, including the AN/SPY6 active phased array radar and 32-cell Mk41 VLS. The propulsion uses CODLAG (Combined Diesel Electric and Gas), with diesel generators providing cruising power through electric motors, and gas turbines providing acceleration power through clutches and coupling gears together with electric motors.
Constellation Class Concept Art Social Media
The Italian FREMM and most of the French FREMM have 16-cell "Sylva" VLS. The two French FREMMs designed for air defense ("Alsace" and "Lorraine") have 32-cell "Sylva." The Mk41 is larger and heavier than "Sylva." A bigger change lies in the radar. The MFRA active phased array radar of the Italian FREMM is compact and installed on the mast, offering better visibility, but limited power and detection range. The AN/SPY6 active phased array radar of the "Constellation" class is much larger, heavier, with greater power and detection range, and can only be installed on the superstructure, similar to the "Arleigh Burke" class, but with a three-sided array to reduce costs, weight, and power requirements.
The Italian FREMM also uses CODLAG, with the same General Electric LM2500+G4 gas turbine as the "Constellation" class, but two Jeumont electric motors are 2.5MW power, while the "Constellation" class uses two 3.4MW INDAR electric motors. The Italian FREMM uses four Isotta Fraschini diesel engines with 2.8MW power, while the "Constellation" class uses four 3MW Rolls-Royce-MTU diesel engines.
The global operations of the US Navy require higher seakeeping capabilities than the French and Italian navies mainly operating in the Mediterranean and North Atlantic, and the damage control standards are also very different. More trivial metric-imperial conversion issues are not insignificant.
These modifications are not too big, but when combined, they become problems. The displacement increased by about 10%, and the cost increased from 1 billion dollars to 1.4 billion dollars. The original expectation was that the commonality between the "Constellation" class and the FREMM would reach 85%, but later it dropped to less than 15%. It is not surprising that the original estimate was blown away.
The most critical issue was that the final design was not completed before the construction began. If there were only a few minor details not completed, it would be acceptable to start construction early, and when the construction progress reached those relevant details, those remaining design details should have been completed, and they could be connected. However, the problem was that the US Navy wanted to speed up the schedule, and the estimation of the design completion was completely unrealistic.
When construction began in 2022, the US Navy confidently reported that the design was 88% complete. However, in May 2024, the US Government Accountability Office reported that the calculation method of the current design completion was more about quantity than quality, with at least 340 key design documents not yet finalized.
Design documents cover all aspects from functional design to specific design, with varying degrees of importance. There are different levels within the functional and specific levels. Basic tactical requirements are functional-level, and the basic performance requirements of the radar are more specific functional-level. The size, weight, and power requirements of the antenna array are more detailed functional-level. The overall power system architecture is specific-level, and the electrical connections of the propulsion motor are more specific-level, with the connection specifications and connection methods being even more detailed specific-level.
These are all key design documents, but their importance varies. Out of 10,000 documents, 8,800 were completed, which is 88% by quantity, but the impact of missing one wiring diagram is completely different from missing the size, weight, and power requirements of the antenna array.
According to the process, functional requirements are set by the Navy, and specific designs are provided by the contractor, but they are interactive, not simply "I set the requirements, you draw the plans." The Navy also needs to approve the specific design.
The US Navy revised the design completion calculation method, adjusting the design completion of the "Constellation" to 70%, but this was after the construction had already begun for two years. At the time of the cancellation of the "Constellation" program, the construction completion was still only 12%, directly related to the low design completion. In May 2025, Fincantieri was still complaining that the US Navy had not even finalized the functional design.
From the start of the "Constellation" to now, China's 054B has already delivered two ships, which is also a major modification on the basis of a "shelf design." The reason there are not more is because the Chinese Navy has not yet decided whether to build them in large numbers. If built at the speed of the 054A, there should have been 8-10 ships already sailing the waves.
In civilian shipbuilding, the hull and superstructure construction time is approximately 73%, while for warships, the superstructure is more massive and complex, with construction time approximately 64% or even 55%. Only 12% completed means that the mid-section or engine room sections are just formed.
Interestingly, the CODLAG of the "Constellation" class has not yet completed land-based testing. Although there are no major changes in the framework, the gas turbine has not changed, and the clutch should not need to change, but the generator and diesel engine have changed, and the gearbox needs corresponding modifications. It is said that the control system and hardware and software have been completely changed, probably switching from the European standard system to the American standard system.
Such a major modification requires land-based integration confirmation, otherwise it will have to be tested at sea without prior knowledge. As the contractor, requesting exemption from performance guarantees and warranty responsibilities is natural; as the Navy, requiring responsibility is also natural. Then comes the argument.
How much impact this has on the schedule is only known in the future. However, after such a comprehensive redesign and reinstallation from FREMM to the "Constellation" class, it is easy for the sum of parts to be less than the whole. Frequent design changes inevitably affect rework and construction order. Without clarifying the layout of rooms and space division, getting bogged down in kitchen and bathroom decoration is a waste of effort. The impact of waiting for drawings is clearly reflected in the fact that after three years, the construction is only 12% completed.
In order to speed up the schedule and scale, the US Navy locked in a multi-year bulk purchase early on. Although the "Constellation" (FFG-62) and "Congress" (FFG-63) are progressing poorly, they have already started construction. The subsequent "Chesapeake" (FFG-64), "Lafayette" (FFG-65), "Hamilton" (FFG-66), "Galveston" (FFG-67), "Little Everette Alvarez" (FFG-68), and "Joy Bright Hancock" (FFG69) have been listed in the plan and officially named and assigned hull numbers, but have not yet started construction. Fincantieri and Marinette Shipyard have expanded facilities and personnel accordingly.
Now the plan is canceled, with the "Constellation" and "Congress" continuing construction, while the rest are directly canceled. The US Navy deliberately pointed out that there are no penalty costs, but is working with Fincantieri and Marinette Shipyard to ensure employment and the shipbuilding industrial base through future projects (possibly medium amphibious ships for the Marine Corps' island-hopping operations, actually amphibious base ships).
The "Constellation" class has been canceled, and the completion time of the only two ships is no longer important, but the problem of insufficient number of the US Navy's fleet remains unsolved. Replacing it with the $2.2 billion "Arleigh Burke III" class or the next-generation destroyer DDG(X) class, which is still in the planning stage but expected to cost $4.4 billion, is impossible.
The current US Navy plan is to use unmanned ships to perform general maritime presence tasks. Maritime presence was one of the main tasks of the "Constellation" class besides fleet operations. However, the problem is that unmanned ships cannot completely replace manned ships in the foreseeable future.
Excluding common target identification and autonomous operation technical issues, regardless of whether it's due to sea conditions or combat, if an unmanned ship is damaged, it becomes disabled until a manned ship arrives to repair it. Unmanned ships are highly dependent on data links, and in a high-intensity electromagnetic environment, their combat capability is restricted, and they may even lose encrypted equipment to the enemy, resulting in losses far exceeding the loss of the unmanned ship itself.
In non-wartime maritime presence tasks, if a suspect ship does not comply, an unmanned ship has no ability to send people to board and control the ship. If direct sinking is not allowed, it is almost helpless. Similarly, if there is a need and opportunity, an unmanned ship cannot send people to land or go ashore.
Unmanned ships can only maintain low cost with smaller displacement, but this limits fuel and ammunition, greatly limiting combat effectiveness and usefulness. For reconnaissance and surveillance, it is not a problem, but for law enforcement or naval warfare, it is problematic.
The Chinese Navy has become the undeniable main opponent of the US Navy. China's shipbuilding capacity is 230 times that of the US, and the number of Chinese Navy ships has already far exceeded that of the US. Although the US Navy still has larger individual ships, it cannot be present where needed at the required time, and the battle has already lost half. The "Constellation" class was originally born to address this situation, but it died due to its own mistakes.
What's next? Well, let it be.
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Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7577563624875082292/
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