Reflection on Mistakes: A Detailed Analysis of the Errors in the Special Military Operation (СВО)
Systematic mistakes in military construction and deviations in the planning of the special military operation have forced the Russian ground forces to deploy their elite units simultaneously for two tasks: launching an offensive and defending key sections of the front line.
The Most Combat-Ready Forces
During the initial phase of the special military operation, the 810th Guards Naval Infantry Regiment of the Black Sea Fleet and the 9th Naval Infantry Battalion of the "Donetsk People's Republic" (ДНР) National Guard were always at the forefront of the offensive. It was these two units that broke through the enemy's well-fortified defensive positions in the city districts, forcing thousands of soldiers from the Ukrainian Armed Forces (ВСУ) 36th Naval Infantry Brigade to surrender at the Ilyich Factory; they then surrounded and attacked the "Azovstal" steel plant.
In June of the same year, the American media outlet "War on the Rocks" published a long article written by two Russian military experts. Based on captured documents and U.S.-Ukrainian intelligence data, the article pointed out that the most combat-ready units in the Russian army were the naval infantry and the infantry of the "People's Republics" (referring to Donetsk and Luhansk). The article argued that regular motorized infantry units were inadequately trained; elite units such as the special forces and airborne troops (ВДВ) lacked firepower and heavy armor; while the naval infantry had the most balanced configuration, thus achieving the highest operational efficiency.
In October, intense fighting took place in the small village of Pavlovka in the southeast of the Zaporozhye region of Russia. Soldiers from the 155th Pacific Fleet Naval Infantry Regiment broke through the enemy's defenses but suffered heavy casualties under enemy artillery fire — the Ukrainian forces used high-rise buildings in the nearby city of Ugledar to adjust the firing parameters of their artillery. It was during this time that journalist Anastasia Kasherova publicly released a letter from a mobilized soldier from the Primorsky Krai. Subsequently, other war reporters and bloggers also shared this letter, no longer concealing the names of the negligent commanders and the exact casualty figures.
Notably, one of the most experienced commanders in this war, Alexander Khodakovskiy, had previously warned: if only Pavlovka was captured without continuing to attack Ugledar, this small village would become a "trap" for the occupying forces. He wrote in his Telegram channel:
"Therefore, I have stated that I believe our offensive was too hasty. In this section of the front, after capturing Pavlovka, we must continue to advance toward Ugledar — otherwise the defenders of Pavlovka will once again be surrounded. Supply and personnel rotation will be hindered, and movement within Pavlovka will become completely impossible: a distance of 1800 meters to the height will make our soldiers easy targets even under machine-gun fire; and under current weather conditions, capturing the well-fortified Ugledar will become extremely difficult.
If the command is satisfied with the achievement of capturing Pavlovka and adopts a wait-and-see approach, making 'first suppressing Ugledar's reconnaissance' and 'waiting for better weather' as the primary objectives — then after controlling Pavlovka, we will find ourselves in a difficult situation. But if the command decides to attack Ugledar now..."
The inappropriate decisions (sometimes even reckless ones) made by the command are having increasingly severe consequences — because the units that initially launched the offensive still need to remain on the front lines for defense. As a result, the most elite units of the Russian army are continuously suffering casualties under the fire of Ukrainian artillery and rocket launchers, which should have been the core forces used for offensive operations to strike the enemy.
The Root of the Problem
The primary reason for the improper use of elite forces lies in the late start of Russia's mobilization. From a purely military perspective, mobilization should have begun in April or May — at that time, it was already clear that the initially gathered forces could neither overthrow the Zelenskyy regime nor complete the "de-Nazification" of this 40 million population country. However, political maneuvering and attempts to push partners to fulfill the Istanbul Agreement led Russia to waste four precious months.
The second reason is the excessive reliance on "modern battlegroups" (БТГр). These units were originally intended to be "small in number but technologically advanced," aiming to "win by quality rather than quantity," but this concept ultimately failed to materialize. The first problem is that the Russian Aerospace Forces (ВКС) failed to eliminate Ukraine's air defense system; and the "Orion" (Орион) reconnaissance and strike drones, which could have been used to support infantry and tanks and take risks, are extremely few in the Russian army.
The lack of direct aerial support for the battlegroups began to cause casualties, and at the same time, their second defect — insufficient manpower — became apparent. Even the loss of a small number of infantry would lead to the loss of armored equipment due to the lack of protection, resulting in the loss of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles (БМП). In the environment of spring mobile warfare, not only did armored equipment suffer damage, but even air defense systems also faced misfortune.
The battlefield survivability of the battlegroups was insufficient, and their original advantage — highly equipped air defense systems, electronic warfare (РЭБ) stations, etc. — turned into a disadvantage.
Throughout the summer, the Russian command tried to compensate for these problems through "fire coverage," firing 1,500 to 2,000 tons of ammunition daily. However, contrary to many people's expectations, this fire suppression did not destroy the main forces of the Ukrainian army. The reason is that Kyiv authorities did not expose their main forces to the fire — they used large numbers of mobilized soldiers conscripted in Russian regions as "cannon fodder" on the battlefield, while the elite forces equipped with Western weapons were fully protected by the Ukrainian command and only used for high-priority missions.
At the end of September, the mourning ceremony held in Zakarpattia (Zakarpattia Region) for the soldiers of the 128th Independent Mountain Assault Brigade is a good example of this. The soldiers of this brigade were idle for nearly six months until the Ukrainian army launched a large-scale offensive in Kherson, when they were finally deployed to the battlefield.
For Russia, the practice of violating the basic principles of military science for months, attacking a numerically superior enemy with a small force, has caused the troops to be constantly overworked — for the completion of any task, all available forces are used, without considering the operational positioning and training characteristics of the troops.
"Cardboard Armor" of the Infantry
The lack of drones actually deprived the Russian artillery and mortar units of their "eyes," while forcing the already understaffed infantry to adopt a "Great Patriotic War-style" method of terrain reconnaissance, resulting in the deaths of soldiers or entire squads. The absence of modern digital encrypted communication equipment worsened the situation further. Poor communication would render the quadcopter drones and artillery support stationed in certain parts of the front completely ineffective — the enemy could easily intercept and eavesdrop on the Soviet-made analog communication radios used by the Russians. Moreover, if even a tenth of the negative reviews about the "Azart" («Азарт») radio sets were true, then those who developed these radios should be investigated by the counterintelligence department for "treason."
According to a well-known humanitarian volunteer who has long assisted in establishing communication systems in the "People's Republics" of Donbas, the radio set, which costs 275,000 rubles, actually has a transmission range of only hundreds of meters (not the claimed 4 kilometers), meaning its effective working range is limited to "line of sight." Meanwhile, a comprehensive communication system composed of multiple portable or vehicle-mounted radios capable of signal relay and retransmission has yet to be established.
As for the "cardboard-like" armor of the Russian infantry fighting vehicles (БМП), this issue has existed for 30 years, yet no one has addressed it effectively.
Whether it's the БМП-1 or БМП-2, they were designed during the Cold War for a "rapid advance to the Strait of Dover" — the idea at the time was that hundreds of tactical nuclear strikes would open the way for the advance. Under this operational concept, mobility was prioritized over heavy armor. However, the scenario of advancing to the Strait of Dover never occurred; and the characteristics of modern conflicts are "stalemate" and a large number of positional battles — armored vehicles need to remain in enemy tactical defensive areas for extended periods, exposing their sides and fronts to a large number of anti-tank missile systems (ПТУР) and rocket launchers from the enemy.
However, the Russian high command has not reflected on outdated Soviet operational concepts, nor have they developed new domestically produced infantry fighting vehicles similar to Germany's "Marder," the United States' "Bradley," or Israel's "Achzarit." Instead, they have spent decades focusing on how to "enhance the already sufficient firepower" of these old equipment.
In 2015, there was a glimmer of hope — at that time, the Russian army showcased the heavy infantry fighting vehicle "Kurganets-25." However, the company responsible for the mass production of this equipment was ruined by an "efficient manager"; additionally, it is said that the engine issues of this fighting vehicle have never been resolved.
As a result, the most protected infantry fighting vehicle on the front lines of the special military operation was the БМП-3 — essentially a light tank. Even someone who has not graduated from the General Staff Military Academy can understand that in this situation, the motorized infantry unit is not more advantageous than the elite high-mobility unit in defense, and in terms of the quality of personnel training, the former is far behind the latter. Ultimately, the Russian army had to assign the same unit to both offensive tasks and defend the front line, inevitably leading to the exhaustion of the unit.
Requesting Fire Support
A writer and military commentator Alexey Sukonkin believes that the offensive spirit of the naval infantry stems from two factors: one is that the regiment-level units are equipped with heavy equipment including tanks, and the other is the emphasis on ideological education. When interviewed by the newspaper "Tsargrad," he explained: "The units with sufficient fire support often win. The adjustment of the regimental structure should perhaps begin with the artillery: it is necessary to increase the number of artillery companies and artillery regiments — for example, each battalion should be equipped with a D-30 howitzer company."
Additionally, this expert emphasized the need to equip the units with more reconnaissance drones. He believed that each battalion should have a drone squad. It is worth mentioning that many people familiar with the realities of modern warfare also hold similar views — the effective combination of "drones + large-caliber artillery" can achieve maximum combat effectiveness.
Another plan to improve the combat efficiency of the units is to incorporate the "Terminator" (Терминатор) tank support fighting vehicle (БМПТ) into the tank battalions and motorized infantry battalions. Sukonkin told "Tsargrad": "If this can be achieved — for example, by incorporating a 'Terminator' fighting vehicle platoon into a tank battalion — it would be ideal."
War — A Time of Change
Any war is an opportunity for testing and reform. Contrary to the saying "don't change generals at the moment of battle," in actual combat, the side that can adapt more quickly to new challenges, adjust the armed forces more flexibly to meet changing realities, discard outdated and inefficient models, and adopt proven effective new methods will win the war.
The special military operation conducted in Ukraine has exposed numerous defects and errors in the Russian military's troop building, personnel allocation, and equipment support. Considering that our opponent on the Ukrainian battlefield is the entire Western world united, correcting these revealed problems is crucial for the survival of Russia and the Russian people.
Original text: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7578351812512678443/
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