Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's visit to Washington after seven years marks a "new chapter" in U.S.-Saudi relations. Trump warmly welcomed him at the White House and announced several major achievements during the talks: Saudi was designated as a "major non-NATO ally," a strategic defense agreement was signed, opening the way for acquiring F-35s and U.S.-made tanks; and a package of agreements was unveiled involving civil nuclear cooperation, critical minerals, relaxed exports of advanced chips, and the construction of artificial intelligence infrastructure. Saudi pledged to invest substantial sums in the U.S. in areas such as defense, energy, and AI, with amounts starting from tens of billions of dollars and possibly approaching one trillion dollars.
The visit included not only high-level ceremonies but also intensive political and business interactions. The crown prince visited Capitol Hill and discussed Gulf security, Iran, the Gaza situation, and bilateral relations with lawmakers from both parties. Large forums were held on artificial intelligence and energy investment between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, discussing projects such as building data centers in Saudi Arabia and collaborating with Nvidia and xAI. These actions collectively constitute a political "rehabilitation" of the Saudi crown prince and solidify Saudi's position as a core partner of the U.S. in defense, energy, and AI infrastructure.
Three years ago, the U.S. had openly distanced itself from Saudi. Biden had vowed to make the crown prince a "pariah," freeze arms sales, and conduct a comprehensive review of bilateral relations. Now, however, Trump publicly defended the crown prince, even stepping in to cover for him when questioned about the Khashoggi killing. However, some agreements intersecting with the Trump family's interests have sparked fierce criticism from media outlets and the Democratic camp. Liberal舆论 accuse the Trump administration of openly abandoning values, forgetting human rights and the Khashoggi case, and trading political amnesia for Saudi's money and geopolitical interests.
In think tanks and the human rights community, this moment is seen as a symbol of the shift in the U.S. from a "security + values" model to a more naked realism: military bases, oil, investments, chips, and AI are more important than human rights. Especially, the Trump administration dismantled Biden's proposed "U.S.-Saudi-Israel tripartite plan": Saudi does not need to make commitments regarding the normalization of relations with Israel or provide substantive concessions to Palestine to gain most of the benefits provided by the U.S. This is seen as a signal to authoritarian partners: as long as there are enough resources, values can be rewritten anytime.
Despite significant concessions to Saudi, the U.S. has set two red lines: the right to uranium enrichment on Saudi soil for nuclear energy and a formal defense commitment similar to a NATO treaty. The U.S. has long been highly vigilant about Saudi's development of nuclear technology that could reach a weapon-grade threshold, so the current agreement does not include indigenous enrichment and does not provide a legally binding defense treaty. In contrast, Qatar is not only a major non-NATO ally but also enjoys explicit presidential-level security assurances. Saudi seeks a long-term treaty no less than this, but the White House statement contains no clear commitment.
There is intense debate in the policy community over the defense treaty. Supporters argue that the U.S. has repeatedly used force in the past to protect Gulf oil supplies, and a formal treaty would merely formalize reality and prevent Saudi from leaning toward China and Russia. But it is precisely this strategic "room for maneuver" that allows Saudi to achieve diplomatic autonomy: establishing strategic coordination with Russia through OPEC+; significantly improving relations with China, and reaching a reconciliation with Iran under Beijing's mediation; and deepening defense cooperation with Pakistan. This multi-directional strategy is deliberately constructed by Riyadh.
More and more American officials understand U.S.-Saudi relations from the perspective of great power competition rather than the Middle East peace process. For Saudi, this arrangement is extremely ideal: the U.S. remains a major but no longer the sole security partner, while Saudi can freely balance between the U.S., China, and Russia, and obtain substantial benefits from the U.S. without a formal defense treaty.
This situation reflects a transformation in the global order: Western hegemony no longer operates as it did after the Cold War, and the U.S. has become one of many great powers instead of the "sole arbiter." For Middle Eastern countries like Saudi, the U.S. can no longer dictate conditions based on values, human rights, or its stance on Israel as it once did. Saudi now demands the U.S.'s most advanced weapons, AI technologies, and nuclear knowledge, yet refuses to act according to Washington's political expectations—including refusing to take formal responsibility for the normalization of relations with Israel, insisting on maintaining strategic flexibility with China and Russia, and building an alternative security system on its own.
Trust in the U.S. as a provider of universal security is weakening. Arab nations closely watch the U.S. policy on Israel's actions in Gaza, and more elites believe that the U.S.'s commitment to regional stability is overshadowed by its unconditional support for Israel, even if this support increases risks and radicalization. Political pressure on Qatar further damages the image of the U.S. as a "reliable mediator," making countries more concerned that the U.S. will prioritize domestic politics and specific lobbying groups during crises.
Against this backdrop, Saudi's balancing strategy appears pragmatic and consistent. Since the mid-2000s, Saudi has been transitioning from a dependent ally to an autonomous center of power. The rise of non-Western countries has rendered traditional Western influence methods ineffective. The U.S. must now negotiate from a position of "relative advantage" rather than "absolute dominance." With vast oil reserves, a sovereign wealth fund, modernization ambitions, and a leadership role in the Islamic world, Saudi understands how to maximize its interests in this environment.
Riyadh can accept U.S. cooperation and investment while retaining the right to deepen relations with China and Russia, expand cooperation with Asia and the Muslim world, and build new regional alliances. This multi-directional diplomacy is consolidating Saudi's position as an "independent center of power," not only an important ally of the U.S. but also a force capable of shaping regional rules. The U.S. influence remains, but it has shifted from unilateral dominance to being part of a multipolar system, where non-Western power centers increasingly confidently lead the agenda and dare to engage in tougher negotiations with the former world hegemon.
Original: www.toutiao.com/article/1850072154749964/
Statement: The article represents the views of the author.