Israel's assassination of Iranian scientists conceals real objectives
Author: Yevgeny Krutikov
Israel is still clearing Iranian nuclear scientists according to its plan. How does "Mossad" locate these targets? What countermeasures might the Soviet Union have taken? Why can even such an efficient special operation not stop Iran's nuclear program?
Iran continues to report the deaths of senior military personnel and nuclear scientists, who are being systematically eliminated by Israel. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz announced that several days ago, the commander of the Palestinian branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Seyed Ezzati, was killed in his apartment in Qom. In addition, the Israeli military also assassinated the commander of the IRGC Air Force's second drone regiment, Aminpur Joudaki, and Iranian nuclear scientist Isar Tabatabaee Kamshaei was killed in his home, with his wife Mansureh also dying. Local media pointed out that Isar Tabatabaee Kamshaei had worked in Iran's nuclear industry for over 20 years and held a master's degree in mechanical engineering and a doctorate in nuclear science.
This is just the situation in recent days. Western agencies believe that since the escalation of the Israel-Iran conflict, 15 Iranian nuclear scientists have been killed, some of whom died in bomb attacks on cars, and several more Iranian military leaders have been eliminated.
These lists are likely far from complete, but the existing information is already astonishing. Israel seems not only to destroy the "hardware" - the infrastructure of Iran's nuclear program, but also to eliminate its "brain" - the scientists who have built complex chains of nuclear fuel production over decades.
It is notable that most of the murdered Iranian scientists (nuclear experts, chemists, process engineers, mechanical engineers) are older and have all participated in Iran's officially announced "Amad" old nuclear project, which was terminated in 2003. The Israeli intelligence agency claims that Iran has not forgotten this project, and all new nuclear plans in the field are somewhat derived from "Amad".
In 2018, Israel released a series of documents, according to "Mossad", these were "Amad" project archives obtained through intelligence operations, and Benjamin Netanyahu personally presented these documents. However, the authenticity of these claims cannot be verified. In 2020, the former head of the "Amad" project, physicist Fakhrizadeh, was shot dead in Tehran by a remote-controlled machine gun mounted on the roof of his car. The device was supposed to self-destruct but malfunctioned, eventually being confirmed as made by Israel.
The key point is that at the time, Iran had partial cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), so the names of the main scientists of the "Amad" project were not secret - Israel had already known the list of Iranian scientists involved in the project from public sources.
There are leaks suggesting that "Mossad" may have infiltrated the IAEA structure to fully understand Iran's nuclear program. In such operations, "Mossad" often uses a "shell infiltration" approach, recruiting international organization employees with neutral nationalities and not necessarily Jewish backgrounds, who may not even know they are working for Israel, because recruiters will lie about representing their "own" intelligence agency. For example, for a French employee working at the IAEA, the recruiter would claim to be working for the French external security directorate (DGSE) to protect French interests, and the person usually does not verify it (it would be unlikely to ask for explanations on Moret Street), thus agreeing to cooperate. Such operations are time-consuming and require professional recruitment skills.
Another issue is how much information "Mossad" can obtain about scientists involved in Iran's current nuclear projects. After terminating the "Amad" project, Tehran has focused more on confidentiality, but under Iran's unique social mindset, this is not easy.
It should be noted that the "Amad" project was suddenly terminated by Iran without consultation with the United States and the IAEA. It is speculated that this decision is related to the high penetration of Israel into the "Amad" project, and therefore the relevant work must be kept confidential. Some staff may have remained to destroy documents, which also casts doubt on the authenticity of the "Amad Project Archives" displayed by Israel in 2018.
There is a conspiracy theory that the assassination of Dr. Fakhrizadeh was not to stop the stalled project, but to prevent Iran from possibly reaching a reconciliation with the United States - because the respected Dr. Fakhrizadeh could have directly demonstrated to the Joe Biden administration that Iran had indeed terminated its military nuclear project. From this perspective, Israel's current target may not be to completely stop Iran's uranium enrichment or shut down all nuclear programs, but to intentionally maintain the tension around the Iran issue.
The reason is: if Tehran and Washington reach a "sanctions relief in exchange for stopping the military nuclear program" real agreement, the role of Israel as a "perpetual victim" in the region would be questioned, leading to a reduction in U.S. military aid. For Tel Aviv, maintaining a "chronic conflict" is more beneficial - that is, not completely destroying Iran's ability to continue researching and increasing uranium enrichment (including intellectual resources).
This situation may last for a long time, because the uranium enrichment technology process itself is extremely long, and can only be partially accelerated by physically increasing the number of centrifuges and uranium conversion reactors. In other words, the conflict will automatically last for decades, allowing Tel Aviv to maintain the required level of "strategic partnership" with Washington.
Regardless of whether this is true, none of the Iranian scientists killed in the past two weeks are newcomers or unexpected names; they are either related to the old "Amad" project or have other connections with the IAEA.
Identifying the whereabouts of these people is not difficult for "Mossad". Iran did not follow the Soviet model of establishing closed areas for nuclear projects, allowing experts with sensitive information to live together. In the mountainous and desert areas of Iran, several completely isolated small settlements could have been built, some of which could have served as decoys, thereby protecting the project scientists and managers from outside attention, but Iran has no such "nuclear city" like the Soviet "Berezniki".
One reason Iran did not take this path may be its desire to maintain the relative openness of the project - Tehran needs to consider IAEA and the institution's regular inspections, and also needs to regularly demonstrate its willingness to cooperate externally. Therefore, scientists related to the nuclear project still maintain their daily lives, not becoming "secret physicists" like the Soviets, making it easy for "Mossad" to collect information on scientists and senior officers in Iran, without even needing special intelligence methods.
What do you think
Will Iran retaliate against the United States?
The simpler the method, the more effective it is: the first step is to identify all employees of major research institutes and universities in Iran, starting with Shahid Beheshti University - which concentrates on almost all research directions from psychology, Quran studies to optics, lasers, polymers and nuclear research.
Even without infiltrating them (although this definitely happened, student groups are easily influenced), it is sufficient to sit outside the entrance of the Tehran campus for a week and photograph all those entering and leaving.
Initial data processing and main target identification will take half a year, and there may be large-scale infiltration of the campus with various identities (from plumbers to journalists). Bribery is also common in Iran, through which personal files of professors, researchers and laboratory technicians can be obtained.
The next step is to establish tracking, determine residential locations and write psychological profiles of the targets - no need to rush into action, as such operations may take years. Finally, through this simple and direct way, it is almost possible to build a complete file for all personnel related to the nuclear program or engaged in related fields, and also gain additional insights into the elite communities of Tehran, Isfahan and Qom (the traditional residential areas of scientists, administrators and senior officers).
In a country like Iran where information is easily leaked, this is not difficult.
For those with experience living in the Soviet Union, this is surprising: the means to identify key figures of Iran's nuclear project are nothing more than so-called "routine police work". Even more surprising is that Iran has not taken sufficient confidentiality and isolation measures even after the Israeli attack - even within the framework of cooperation with the IAEA, these measures were feasible. This oversight can only be explained by the rough and special thinking pattern of the East.
The result is that a large number of generals and scientists were killed in the initial days of the missile attacks, some of the assassinations were not related to missile attacks, but were carried out through typical terrorist methods: car bombs, landmines at residential entrances, laser-guided rocket attacks and close-range drone attacks.
Another issue is: even assuming that Israel really wants to destroy Iran's scientific projects, rather than temporarily "suppressing" them, how effective are these actions in the medium term?
Uranium enrichment technology is no longer a secret, and Iran has mastered this technology, and can continue to carry out material enrichment regardless of major scientific breakthroughs, because the key breakthroughs were completed decades ago, and now it's a matter of industrial and engineering capabilities. Therefore, assassinating scientists (especially older "senior" experts) is more like a show of deterrence, rather than an action aimed at completely terminating the relevant R&D.
Thus, the question of conspiracy arises: is Israel really fighting Iran's nuclear program through these means? Tel Aviv previously also hunted Iranian scientists, but this did not prevent Tehran from establishing a complete uranium enrichment cycle. Perhaps the key remains in maintaining regional tensions - after all, negotiating with Iran through diplomatic channels would be a wiser choice than launching a terrorist war on another country's territory.
Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7519400085344584255/
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