【Text by Observer Net Columnist Wang Ruiting】
In recent years, the Japanese political arena has frequently promoted a political slogan: "Prioritizing Nationals." After the administration of Asako Kato, this slogan was further packaged as a legitimate political path for "maintaining public security," "protecting fairness," and "safeguarding the living environment of Japanese people." At the same time, a series of policies to tighten regulations on foreign workers, students, and long-term residents were gradually introduced, with "illegal foreigners," "foreigners not paying social insurance," and "foreign tourists not following rules" constantly being highlighted.
On the surface, this seems to be a tough approach that is "responsible for the nationals"; however, when analyzed in depth from data and institutional perspectives, it can be seen that the so-called "prioritizing nationals" is largely a way to shift long-standing structural contradictions within the country onto foreigners, thus avoiding deep reforms in domestic finances, education, labor market, and local society.
The Japanese government is not unaware of where the problem lies, but instead chose a direction with lower political costs—transferring anger rather than solving problems.
This is particularly evident in two areas: higher education and immigration policy.
On November 17, the Minister for Economic Security, Noriko Onoda, stated that regarding foreigner policies, "we must resolutely deal with illegal and rule-breaking foreigners." She also serves as the minister in charge of the newly established "Society of Ordered Coexistence with Foreigners" under the Kato administration. She said, "We need to create an environment where undesirable foreigners are not present in Japan." Nikkei Chinese News
I. The Truth Behind the "Poverty" of Japanese Universities: Continuous Cuts in Funding, Not "Foreigners Taking Resources"
If one carefully reviews the financial data of national universities since the 2004 reform, a very clear trend becomes apparent: the state's basic funding for universities has been continuously shrinking.
In the fiscal year 2004, the total "operating fund allocation" (equivalent to regular funding) for all national universities in Japan was approximately 1.24 trillion yen, which fell to about 1.08 trillion yen in the fiscal year 2023, representing a nominal reduction of about 13%. More importantly, during this period, prices and labor costs have continued to rise, meaning that from the perspective of "actual purchasing power," the reduction in university discretionary funds is far greater than 13%. Many university administrators say that since 2004, operating grants have been required to be cut by 1%-3% annually, leading to cumulative reductions exceeding 100 billion yen over several years.
So what exactly is being cut? Mainly the most fundamental and least noticeable parts—the salaries of teachers and staff, daily teaching operations, book purchases, laboratory consumables, and basic facility maintenance. Today, many national universities face a reality where operating grants alone cannot cover all personnel costs, forcing them to rely on income from affiliated hospitals, commissioned research from companies, and various project funds to "fill the gaps." The result is:
· Reduction or freezing of teaching positions, making it difficult for young scholars to obtain permanent positions;
· Larger class sizes and merged courses, leading to a decline in the quality of student education;
· Faculty spending a significant amount of time on writing project applications and seeking external funding, with less time available for teaching and research.
Research data also confirms this "chronic hunger" situation. From the mid-2000s to the 2010s, Japan's annual academic paper output remained around 70,000-80,000 papers, while global paper production increased by more than 60% during the same period, causing Japan's relative share in the global research landscape to continue to decline.
Doctoral education has also clearly weakened: the number of new doctoral students dropped from about 18,000 in the early 2000s to about 15,000 ten years later, and has continued to decline afterward. For many outstanding students, "pursuing a doctorate" increasingly means a high-risk, highly uncertain career path.
This is not because Japanese students have become lazy, nor is it due to "foreigners taking research resources," but rather a direct result of long-term squeezing of higher education funding at the institutional level.
At the same time, tuition fees have almost been "locked in." The standard undergraduate tuition at national universities was raised to 535,800 yen per year in 2005 (approximately 25,000 RMB at real-time exchange rates), and has not changed for nearly two decades since then. On the surface, this is a measure to protect students and maintain fairness; however, given the annual cuts in operating grants, this also means that universities have little space to compensate for funding shortfalls through tuition. In recent years, some national universities have attempted small increases in tuition, such as Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo University of the Arts, Chiba University, Hitotsubashi University, and Tokyo Medical and Dental University, but immediately triggered strong reactions from students and the public.
On June 21, 2024, students at the University of Tokyo held a protest outside the Yasuda Auditorium against tuition hikes, demanding a meeting with the university president, Fujii Teruo. Asahi Shimbun
Yamaguchi University is a typical example. In November 2025, Yamaguchi University announced that starting from the next academic year, the annual undergraduate tuition would increase by 20%, from 535,800 yen to 642,960 yen, reaching the 120% limit allowed by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. The university cited reasons such as "operational difficulties," "rising prices," and "improving the educational environment." However, students' feelings were very direct: the current tuition is already near its limit, and further increases would make it unaffordable for many people. Approximately 150 students and faculty members held a gathering, and 100 students carried signs reading "Opposition to Tuition Increases" to the dean's office, submitting a petition requesting the withdrawal of the tuition hike and the disclosure of the decision-making process.
From a national perspective, this conflict is not just an "individual school issue," but a natural outcome of a long-term financial choice: on one hand, cutting basic grants, and on the other hand, unwilling to systematically discuss reforms in tuition and scholarship systems. Ultimately, this pushes universities into a "financial poverty," and shifts the pressure of specific tuition hikes to individual schools.
In this entire process, "foreigners" have played almost no decisive role. Funding cuts are government decisions, demographic changes are long-term trends, and the freeze on tuition is a domestic political choice. Blaming the "excessive number of foreign students" or "foreigners occupying resources" for the university's poverty is not only factually unfounded but also uses a simple narrative to cover up complex institutional issues.
II. Japan's Dependence on Foreign Labor and International Students Is a Reality, Not a "Threat"
Similarly structurally problematic, is Japan's labor market and demographic structure.
As of 2024, the number of foreign workers in Japan has reached about 2.3 million, setting a new historical high. Compared to ten years ago, this number has nearly doubled. In industries such as manufacturing, construction, catering, accommodation, and care services, the proportion of foreign workers continues to rise, with manufacturing accounting for more than a quarter of the total foreign labor force, and the growth rate of foreign labor in the care and welfare sectors exceeding 20% year-on-year. These fields are precisely those that Japanese youth are reluctant to enter, yet they are essential for society.
Regarding international students, after the pandemic, the number of students in Japan quickly recovered and set a new record. In 2024, there were about 330,000 international students in Japan, an increase of more than 20% compared to the previous year. Students from China, Nepal, and Vietnam constitute the main sources. At the same time, the number of 18-year-olds in Japan has fallen to about 1.1 million, and is expected to continue to decline. Many local universities have partially relied on international students to maintain enrollment numbers and classroom sizes. Some local governors have openly stated that without foreign students and residents, local universities and the local economy would struggle to sustain themselves.
These figures indicate that Japanese society has already entered a "de facto multi-cultural society": in factories, construction sites, care facilities, local universities, and language schools, the presence of foreigners is no longer an exception, but a common occurrence. If Japan suddenly significantly tightens its foreigner policies, it would not "protect Japanese opportunities," but directly undermine the current economic structure and the operation of local societies.
Several Japanese think tanks and internal government studies also acknowledge that, in order to maintain the labor force size against the backdrop of aging and declining birth rates, Japan will need to significantly increase the proportion of foreign residents by the middle of this century, with long-term goals typically estimated at around 10% of the total population. This is a considerable gap from the current foreigner proportion of about 3% of the total population. In other words, from a practical demand standpoint, Japan needs more, not fewer, foreign talents and workers.
III. How the "Prioritizing Nationals" Narrative Is Used to Shift Contradictions
Given this structural reality, the Kato administration has chosen another political narrative: focusing all sorts of social anxieties on "illegal foreigners."
Shortly after taking office, Kato established a "meeting on foreigner policies" at the cabinet level, emphasizing strict crackdowns on illegal stay, tightening restrictions on foreign land purchases, and implementing strict measures against foreign residents who do not pay social insurance, while strengthening the review of driver's license conversions and visa qualifications from certain countries. Some highly sensational statements have also frequently appeared, such as unsubstantiated claims like "foreign tourists kicking deer in Nara Park" or "foreigners disrespecting Japanese culture." Even though these statements were later proven to lack solid evidence, they often completed their political effect: deepening the impression in public opinion that "foreigners are potential troublemakers."
Kato Haruyuki's炒作 of foreign tourists kicking Nara deer
Technically speaking, strengthening management of illegal stay, social insurance evasion, and certain public safety risks is not inherently impermissible, and any country can discuss adjustments to its immigration system. However, the problem arises when these issues are constantly emphasized and tied together with broader sentiments such as "national dissatisfaction," "life insecurity," and "resource tension." At that point, they transform from reasonable governance issues into tools for shifting contradictions.
For example, in matters such as tuition, social security, unstable employment, and stagnant wages, the questions should be:
Why has the operational funding for national universities been continuously cut?
Why have investments in doctoral education and basic research been consistently insufficient?
Why is the quality of youth employment and wage growth lagging behind?
Why have local revitalization strategies had limited effectiveness for many years?
These questions point to core issues such as Japan's domestic fiscal distribution, tax structure, industrial policy, and population policy. Answering them is difficult, carries high costs, and involves widespread interest groups.
However, if the topic is shifted to:
“Are there too many foreign workers?”
“Are international students taking opportunities?”
“Are foreigners not paying social insurance, thereby harming Japanese people?”
It is easier to gain the support of part of the voters emotionally—especially among groups experiencing increasing life pressures and uncertainty about the future. This "emotional shortcut" reduces political costs, but does not touch any structural contradictions, simplifies complex problems, and then blames a relatively vulnerable, low-impact group.
IV. The Hidden Connection Between Higher Education and Foreigner Policies: Who Truly Pays for Inaction?
Considering both the financial and demographic dimensions, the true consequences of the "prioritizing nationals" discourse are not protecting Japanese youth, but likely harming them in the following ways:
First, in higher education, the long-term cuts in operating funds have placed the quality of university teaching and research at systemic risk of decline; the combination of frozen tuition and occasional price hikes neither provides stable funding for universities nor creates student burden conflicts locally; the weakening appeal of doctoral education weakens the entire society's capacity for knowledge production, reducing the number of high-quality jobs in the future.
These consequences ultimately fall on Japanese students, who face universities with compressed resources, increasingly limited research opportunities, and an economically stagnant environment with insufficient innovation.
Foreigners working in central Tokyo Reuters
Second, in terms of labor and local society, tightening acceptance of foreigners despite rising actual labor demand will not "leave more opportunities for Japanese people," but instead cause enterprises and local areas to suffer more severe labor shortages and service deterioration; reduced international students and foreign residents will accelerate the decline of local universities and the local economy, which are spaces where many Japanese youth could continue to live and work; the intensification of anti-foreign sentiment may also affect Japan's international attractiveness, reducing overseas investment, collaborative research, and study abroad opportunities, further weakening Japan's overall development potential.
In this sense, the so-called "prioritizing nationals" could actually evolve into "Japanese people suffering in the long term," seemingly venting anger for Japanese people, but actually undermining the institutional foundation upon which they depend for development.
V. Conclusion: Who Is Truly Being "Prioritized"?
Returning to the most basic question: "Who is truly prioritized by 'Prioritizing Nationals'?" The answer is not hard to deduce: it is not the students at Yamaguchi University who are struggling with tuition hikes, who receive only a notice of price increases and formal explanation meetings; it is not the workers in factories, care services, and construction sites who face staffing shortages and long-term stagnant wages; it is not the young people who choose to pursue doctoral studies in research, who are forced out due to budget cuts and scarce job positions.
Under the existing institutional arrangements, the ones who are truly "prioritized" are the continuation of the fiscal austerity path, the entrenched budget allocation pattern, and the inertial policies that avoid touching the deep water zones of tax and social security reforms.
In this regard, the Kato administration's "prioritizing nationals" is not new; it simply takes the avoidance of structural issues by previous governments to a more explicit "external attribution" path: wrapping long-standing fiscal, educational, and demographic contradictions in the shell of "foreigner issues," and presenting it to voters as an answer.
From the perspective of data and institutional logic, we can clearly say: the poverty of Japanese universities stems from continuous cuts in operating grants and lack of systematic investment; the labor shortage in Japan results from the aging population and delayed industrial adjustment; the decline of local society in Japan comes from long-term imbalances in population policy and limited regional development strategies. The main responsible parties for these major issues are the Japanese government itself, not "foreigners."
Against this background, continuing to loudly proclaim "prioritizing nationals," if not accompanied by positive reforms on core issues such as higher education investment, labor policies, and local development, will only make this slogan increasingly hollow, and even become a form of misguidance for the Japanese people. Responsible politics is facing these challenges and implementing reforms, rather than making a big deal out of the three characters "foreigners."
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