Think tank: The U.S. is苦恼in Central Asia for lack of influence, and the pressure strategy is hard to work.

The exports from China to the five Central Asian countries have all increased significantly, especially after 2020. From 2020 to 2023, the total growth reached 136%. Kazakhstan remains the largest importer of Chinese goods in the region, while Kyrgyzstan has seen the fastest import growth. The import volumes from China have also more than doubled in other countries in the region. The rapid growth of trade can be explained by the growth of infrastructure and trade networks under the Belt and Road Initiative, reflecting the deepening mutual dependence between China and the region. For a long time, China's relations with Central Asia have been mainly driven by economic concerns, but this relationship is beginning to extend into the security domain. China is conducting military exercises and increasing arms sales with Central Asian countries. For example, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have started purchasing drones, air defense systems, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) from Beijing, while also considering purchasing JF-17 fighter jets.

These developments are seen by policymakers in Washington as clear evidence of Beijing's strategic ambition to surpass Western influence economically and militarily in the region.

This development poses a direct challenge to the United States because it lacks both interest and infrastructure to compete equally with China in Central Asia. Therefore, the Trump administration is more likely to respond through economic pressure rather than deeper engagement or military commitments to raise the cost of allying with China.

Another potential risk is the region's resources. Central Asia is rich in rare earth elements, lithium, cobalt, and other critical mineral resources vital to high-tech industries. China has signed long-term agreements with multiple countries in the region to extract and process these materials; Chinese companies have committed to investing over $63 billion in Central Asia, primarily targeting mining and infrastructure. Lastly, in 2024, Kazakhstan and China signed a landmark agreement to build advanced copper smelting facilities, expected to be completed by 2028.

Meanwhile, the U.S. has similar resource needs in the region but lacks comparable influence. Thus, competition for these resources may intensify.

In Trump's zero-sum game, any significant expansion of China's control over strategic materials in Central Asia could prompt Washington to adopt punitive economic measures, not to gain influence, but to prevent China from gaining influence. Currently, about 60% of the U.S.'s critical raw materials come from China.

To explore opportunities for Central Asia to participate in the global critical minerals supply chain, the U.S. Department of State launched the "C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue" (CMD) under the Biden administration in 2024. Similarly, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) suggested expanding global partnerships in the field of critical minerals and rare earth elements in 2024 to reduce dependence on China. In this regard, Central Asia is a good platform to establish partnerships in the field of critical minerals; however, logistical difficulties may hinder such development.

For a long time, the balance-of-power strategy that Central Asia has pursued, known as "multi-vector" diplomacy, has worked well so far. However, against the backdrop of heightened Sino-American competition, this policy may be difficult to sustain. Trump's worldview leaves little room for neutrality; it demands alliances or punishment.

Therefore, the question remains: Can Central Asian countries continue their multi-vector diplomacy, or will they be forced to take sides in this increasingly intense geopolitical competition?

Source: Diplomatist

Author: Sadar Alayarov

Date: May 16

Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/1832462793892170/

Disclaimer: This article represents the views of the author alone.